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These silent marshes are as valuable as a Van Gogh, as precious as
the Hope Diamond ....

[They must] no longer play the victim in

the national version of the Texas chain-saw massacre.
-New Jersey Governor Thomas
Kean, Chairman, National Wetlands Policy Forum'
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INTRODUCTION

Wetlands, such as swamps, marshes, and bogs, are among the nation's most productive sources of food protein-more productive than
the most fertile farms.2 Fully two-thirds of commercially harvested
fish in United States waters depend on wetlands for food or spawning
and rearing grounds.3 But protecting wetlands has been difficult.
Wetland benefits are widely dispersed (although often poorly perceived) among fishers, hunters, swimmers, drinkers, and other water
resource users. Unlike other areas of the aquatic environment, how.ever, wetlands are capable of being privately owned. Since wetlands
.often supply attractive sites for industrial, agricultural, and residential
developments, wetland owners have strong economic incentives to replace wetlands with airports, port facilities, soybean fields, and shoreland housing. It is therefore not surprising that over fifty-five percent
of the nation's original wetland acreage has been lost,4 and substantial
wetland acreage continues to be destroyed each year.5
Wetlands can be protected by government purchase, but in an era
of fiscal restraint it is impractical to purchase more than a fraction of
wetlands threatened by development. Conservation easements are another possibility,6 although these too usually require government appropriation and frequently supply only short-term protection.
2. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS 21 (1978); see also NATIONAL WILDLIFE FED'N, A CITIZENS' GUIDE TO PROTECTING WETLANDS 27-31 (1989) (authored
by Jan Goldman-Carter).
3. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimates that the commercial and recreational value of estuarine-dependent fishery species is $27.4 billion annually. Statement of
James W. Brennan, Asst. NOAA Adm'r for Fisheries, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service, Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Public Works and Transportation Comm. at 2
(Sept. 14, 1988).
4. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS
AND RECENT TRENDS (1984).
5. Estimates vary from 300,000 to 500,000 acres annually. See id. (11 million acres destroyed
between 1955 and 1975); U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND
REGULATION 3 (1984); Statement of Janice Goldman-Carter, Fish and Wildlife Div. Counsel to the
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Public Works
and Transportation Comm. at I (Sept. 14, 1988) [hereinafter National Wildlife Federation Comments].
6. See, e.g. Acquisition of Wetlands and Floodplains, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.-Feb. 1980,
at 5; Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3902 (Supp. 1987) (expanding a
variety of government purchase programs to include wetlands acquisition and requiring a national
inventory).
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Terminating subsidies that encourage wetland development would
save many wetlands, 7 but is no substitute for a comprehensive national
wetlands protection program. Currently, regulation is the principal
source of wetlands protection, and the chief regulatory program is a
federal one, authorized by section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 8
Federal wetlands regulation has always been controversial. Since
its enactment in 1972, section 404 has attracted both harsh criticism
and vigorous defenses. To its critics, the 404 permit program represents an unprecedented federal presence in land use regulation.9 To its
defenders, section 404 remains the most effective means of preserving
the nation's diminishing wetland resources.'°
These conflicting perspectives have produced a number of congressional battles over the scope and content of 404 regulation, as well
as continuous administrative reforms. Over the past decade and a half
Congress has resisted efforts to weaken the program legislatively, but
regulatory changes and inconsistent implementation have undermined
the program from within. Hampered by the regulatory ambivalence of
the permit issuing agency-the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps)-and intergovernmental tension between the Corps and the
agency with program oversight responsibilities-the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-the program has been unable to
prevent wetland losses of between 300,000 and 500,000 acres annually."I The 404 program's relative ineffectiveness has prompted recent
calls for reform from the U.S. General Accounting Office and the National Wetlands Policy Forum. 2 Both of these analyses contain useful
7. See, e.g., Tripp & Herz, Wetland Preservation and Restoration: Changing Federal Priorities, 7
VA. J.NAT. RESOURCES L. 221, 252-56 (1988) (discussing the 1985 Food Security Act "swampbuster"
provisions, the 1986 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, and the Coastal Barrier Resources
Act); see also ASCS Reverses Blank Swampbuster Exemption, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.-Feb.
1989, at 5-6 (discussing an Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service decision to reverse an
exemption from the swampbuster provisions in North Dakota); Turrini, ASCS Gets Serious About
Swampbuster, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 8-9 (discussing a similar reversal in
Minnesota); Tripp & Dudek, The Swampbuster Provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985: Stronger
Wetland Conservation If Properly Implemented and Enforced, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,120
(1986); Malone, A Historical Essay on the Conservation Provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill: Sodbusting,
Swampbusting and the Conservation Reserve, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 577 (1986); Blackwelder, Environmental Benefits of Tax Reform, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,322, 10,323 (1986).

8. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
9. See. e.g., Parish & Morgan, History Practice, and Emerging Problems of Wetlands Regulation:
ReconsideringSection 404 of the Clean Water Act, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43 (1982).

10. See, e.g., Blumm, Wetlands Preservation, Fish and Wildlife Protection, and 404 Regulation: A
Response, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 469 (1983).

I1.See supra note 5.
12. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, WETLANDS: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' ADMINIS-

TRATION OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM

(1988) [hereinafter GAO

REPORT]; CONSERVATION FOIJN-

DATION, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA--THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM

(1988) [hereinafter

FORUM REPORT].
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critiques of the program,' 3 but neither addresses the central impediment to an effective regulatory program preserving wetlands: the unwillingness of the permit-issuing agency to implement the program
aggressively.
This article evaluates the 404 program, its history, its operation,
and its future. We conclude that the most troublesome questions concerning the program's jurisdictional scope, permit criteria, and enforcement are the consequence of a long-held regulatory ambivalence
on the part of the permit-issuing entity. Consequently, while we suggest a number of administrative reforms, we reluctantly recommend
that Congress relieve the Corps of Engineers of its permit issuing
responsibilities.
Part I of the article begins by detailing the history of 404 regulation from its nineteenth century antecedents to the regulatory relief
efforts of the Reagan Administration. Part II considers the program's
jurisdictional scope both geographically and over particular types of
activities. Part III explains the procedures and criteria governing 404
permit issuance, including the Corps' public interest review and EPA's
404(b) guidelines. Part IV examines EPA's authority to veto permits
and to prohibit discharges prospectively under section 404(c). Part V
considers enforcement issues such as detecting violators, obtaining restoration orders, and imposing civil penalties. Part VI evaluates the
constitutional proscription against the taking of private property for
public use. We contend that the takings issue should not chill 404
regulation, and we make suggestions as to how the government can
successfully defend against takings claims. Finally, part VII concludes
with a number of administrative and congressional reforms we believe
are necessary if the 404 program is to produce a significant reduction
in the nation's annual rate of wetlands loss.
I.

HISTORY OF SECTION

404

REGULATION

Many of the peculiarities and complexities of 404 regulation are
due to its antecedents: Few environmental regulatory programs can
trace their roots to the nineteenth century. This history accounts for
the Corps of Engineers' role as the permitting agency, which in turn
has produced a considerable amount of intergovernmental tension as
Congress has been unwilling to assign the Corps plenary authority
over wetlands regulation. Instead, it has ratified a complex system of
interagency coordination and checks, described by Professor Rodgers
as an example of "multiple loci of decisional power."' 4 The resulting
13. See infra part Vll.A.
14. 2 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.12, at 185 (1986).
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tension from the Corps' regulatory ambivalence is perhaps the chief
characteristic of the 404 program as it evolved over the past seventeen
years.
A. The Nineteenth Century Antecedents
In 1802, Congress created the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
erect and maintain frontier forts and other defense facilities.' 5 Two
decades later in 1824, Congress authorized the Corps to undertake
river and harbor improvements promoting navigation. t6 In the postCivil War era, navigation appropriations constituted the largest
federal construction expenditures, 7 even though the era of large
multiple-use projects had not yet dawned.' 8 But long before it entrusted navigation responsibilities to the Corps, Congress made draining and filling of wetlands for land reclamation national policy.'
While responsible for river and harbor civil works, the Corps had
no regulatory role until 1890.20 That year, prompted by a Supreme
Court decision holding that, in the absence of a federal regulatory
scheme, Oregon could authorize or prohibit dams, bridges, or other

obstructions to navigation, 2 ' Congress required the approval by the
War Secretary of all construction activities and deposition of refuse
15. Act of March 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 26,2 Stat. 132, 137. On the evolution of the role of the Corps,
see especially Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the US Army Corps of
Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503, 505-09 (1977).
16. Act of May 10, 1824, ch. 48, § I, 2 Stat. 66, 67 (Act authorizing the Corps to deepen the
harbor channel at Presque Isle, Pennsylvania, and to restore Plymouth Beach, Massachusetts).
17. See Moser, Dig They Must: The Army Corps of Engineers--Securing Allies, and Acquiring
Enemies, SMITHSONIAN, Dec. 1976, at 43.
18. Large-scale dam building did not begin until the Progressive Era, when Congress passed the
first Reclamation Act in 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 36 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43
U.S.C. (1982)). The Corps, which was slow to recognize the nonnavigation benefits of water projects,
was not given a role in the reclamation program. See S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 108 (1959) (Corps wedded to single-use projects); A. MORGAN, DAMS-AND OTHER DISASTERS: A CENTURY OF ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN CIVIL WORKS 252-302 (1971) (Corps' resistance to reservoir development to
control floods). The Corps' uneasy relationship with the Progressive conservationists is sketched in
Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage.- Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 181-87 (1983).
19. The Swamp Lands Acts of 1849, 1850, and 1860 granted fifteen western states nearly 65
million acres for swamp "reclamation." See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
CIRCULAR No. 39, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1956). Fortunately, because of the pervasive fraud in nineteenth century land grant programs, not all of the 65 million acres were actually
wetlands, and much of what was wetland was never really reclaimed. See E. DICK, THE LURE OF THE
LAND 358 (1970).
20. The Corps had sought such a role since 1877, however. See Power, supra note 15,at 506
(describing the "Dolph Bill").
21.

Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. I (1888).
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into navigable waters.2 2 Nine years later, Congress revised the regulatory scheme in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.23 Section 10 of
that Act authorized the Secretary to regulate dredging, filling, and
construction activities in navigable waters, while section 13 prohibited
the deposit of refuse without permission of the Secretary.24 Section 10
has remained essentially unchanged for ninety years.25
B. The Evolving Permit Program
Until the 1960s, the Corps confined its permit authority to reviewing the effects on navigation of proposed activities in navigable
waters. 26 The 1899 Act thus remained a relatively uncontroversial
federal control over aquatic development. However, three occurrences
catapulted the old statute into the forefront of the burgeoning environmental movement in the 1960s and early 1970s.
First, the Supreme Court began to construe the Act broadly to
include industrial wastes, irrespective of any effect on navigation.2 7
Thus, the Corps' permit program became a vehicle to control water
pollution. Second, in 1967 the Secretaries of the Army and the Interior signed a Memorandum of Agreement in which the Army Secretary agreed to implement the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act2" by
22. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426, 453-54 (current version at 33 U.S.C.

§§ 401, 403 (1982)).
23. Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403
(1982)). Although represented to Congress as a recodification of the 1890 Act, the 1899 Act enacted
some significant changes, including the requirement in § 9 of congressional consent for bridges, dams,
or causeways. 33 U.S.C. § 401.
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1982).
25. Section 13 has been superseded by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit authority of the Environmental Protection Agency and the states, established by
§ 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). See generally 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14,
§§ 4.11-.12; Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1
(1984); Barker, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and HarborsAct of 1899. Potent Toolsfor Environmental
Protection, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 109 (1976); cf 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.2, 321-22 (1988) (current Corps
regulations).
26. See generally Ablard & O'Neil, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: A Corps of EngineersRenaissance, I VT. L. REV.51, 54-58
(1976).
27. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (discharge of industrial solids
prohibited by § 10); United States v. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. 224 (1966) (discharge of gasoline prohibited by § 13).
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1982) (promising "equal consideration" of wildlife conservation with
other features of water resources development by requiring federal agencies to (1) consult with federal
and state wildlife agencies, (2) give "full consideration" to their recommendations, and (3) include
"justifiable" measures considered by the federal action agency to maximize overall project benefits).
For overviews of the Coordination Act, see Barton, Wetlands Preservation, in THE AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORT 1985, at 218-29 (Nat'l Audubon Soc'y ed. 1985) [hereinafter Barton I]; Veiluva, The Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act in Environmental Litigation, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 489 (1980); Note, Environmental Protection Under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act: The Road Not Taken, 2 VA. J. NAT.
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considering the views of Interior on the merits of proposed activities.2 9
This led, a year later, to the promulgation of the Corps' fabled "public
interest review" as the chief criterion for permit issuance.3 ° Under
this litmus, the Corps began to evaluate proposals on the basis of a
broad-reaching nonquantitative cost-benefit analysis, including balancing project benefits against environmental costs.3 ' Its authority to
deny permits because of adverse effects on fish and wildlife was confirmed in a landmark case in 1970.32
The third development was President Nixon's 1970 Executive Order directing the Corps to institute a comprehensive permit program
regulating the discharge of water pollutants.3 3 Although the program
was quickly enjoined by a federal district court,34 the Executive Order
gave significant impetus to the passage of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments."
C. The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
and Their Aftermath
When Congress enacted its comprehensive regime to produce
fishable and swimmable waters by 1983 and eliminate all pollutant disRESOURCES L. 53 (1982); THE FISH AND WILDLIFE COORDINATION ACT AND COLUMBIA BASIN

WATER PROJECT OPERATIONS (Nat. Resources L. Inst. Anadromous Fish L. Memo No. 6, 1980).

29.

MEMORANDUM

OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN SECRETARY OF THE ARMY STANLEY RESOR

AND SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR STEWART UDALL (July 13, 1967), reprinted in 33 Fed. Reg.
18,672-73 (1968). In the agreement the Army Secretary promised that he would "carefully evaluate"
the advantages and benefits of the proposed activity when the Interior Secretary made a finding that the
activity would "unreasonably impair natural resources or the related environment." Id.
30. 33 Fed. Reg. 18,672-73 (formerly codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1 I) (1969)).
31. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). See infranotes 239-253 and accompanying text.
32. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971):
[The Corps] was entitled, if not required, to consider ecological factors and, being persuaded by them, to deny that which might have been granted routinely five, ten, or fifteen
years ago before man's explosive increase made all, including Congress, aware of civilization's potential destruction from breathing its own polluted air and drinking its own infected water and the immeasurable loss from a silent-spring-like disturbance of nature's
economy.
33. Executive Order No. 11,574. 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (1970).
34. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971) (invalidating the permit program because it
would have allowed the Corps to issue permits for discharges into tributaries of navigable waters, when
§ 13 authorized discharges only in navigable waters; also holding that the Corps could not issue permits
without complying with the procedures established by the recently enacted National Environmental
Policy Act).
35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). The Kalur decision placed thousands of dischargers in violation of the 1899 Act (due to decisions like those mentioned supra note 27) without an administrative
remedy, thus producing widespread interest in a congressional solution. In addition, the peculiar political dynamics of the day had numerous politicians competing for public credit as environmental defenders. See Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward A Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 324-26 (1985) (describing the competition among President Nixon, Senator Muskie, and Senator Jackson as the "Politicians' Dilemma").
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charges by 1985,36 it defined "pollutant" broadly. Because the definition included "dredged spoil," 3 7 it was of no small concern to the
Corps, the nation's largest navigational dredger.38 Not wishing to
have its dredging operations subjected to regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and pointing out that it already was
administering a permit system, the Corps succeeded in convincing
Congress to create an exemption in section 404 of the Act to the EPA
program for discharges of dredged or fill material.39 However, while
section 404 authorized the Secretary of the Army, through the Corps,
to regulate discharges of dredged or fill material, it also established an
oversight role for EPA:' requiring EPA, "in conjunction with" the
41
Corps, to promulgate "guidelines" governing the permit program
and authorizing EPA to veto permits. 4 2 However, it was not the EPA
oversight role, but rather the geographic scope of the program, that
.engendered controversy in the early 1970s.
Under the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Corps' regulatory juris.diction is confined to activities affecting "navigable waters."' 43 The
definition of navigable waters evolved over a century of judicial interpretation from those waters actually used to transport interstate or
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (3) (1982).
37. Id. § 1362(6).
38. 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.12, at 185; id. § 4.13, at 218-21.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. See 1SEN. COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 177 (Comm.
Print 1973) ("The Conferees were uniquely aware of the process by which dredge and fill permits are
presently handled and did not wish to create a burdensome bureaucracy in light of the fact that a
system to issue permits already existed."). Congress gave no indication that it was concerned about the
potential conflict of interest between the Corps' role as the nation's largest dredger and its role in
regulating discharges of dredged spoil. Only two years later in 1974, a similar conflict of interest led to
the breakup of the Atomic Energy Commission. See 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.12, at 185
(warning that the Corps' dredging activities "may influence the scrutiny applied in its regulatory capacity"); cf infra text accompanying note 107 (Corps' exclusion of dredging from the scope of the regulatory program).
40. The EPA oversight role was imposed largely due to Senator Muskie's misgivings about exempting the Corps' program from EPA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. For details on the legislative history, see Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Program Enters
Its Adolescence: An Institutionaland ProgrammaticPerspective, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 410, 415 n.20 (1980)
[hereinafter 404 Program Perspective].
41.
IlI.C.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1); see infra notes 59-61, 71-72, 87-90 and accompanying text and part

42. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (vetoes based on unacceptable adverse effects "on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational
areas"); see infra part IV.A.
43. Section 10 jurisdiction extends to activities affecting "the navigable capacity of any waters of
the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 403. Section 13 regulates discharges "into any navigable water of the
United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be
washed into such navigable water." 33 U.S.C. § 407.
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foreign commerce (navigable in fact)" to include also those waters
that were navigable in the past 45 and those that could become navigable with "reasonable improvements." '46 Although both the Corps and
the courts increasingly recognized that activities outside navigable waters but affecting their course, condition, or capacity were subject to
federal regulation,4 7 the limits of navigable waters remained the ordinary high water mark for fresh waters and the mean high water mark
for tidal waters. 4' These limits placed numerous wetland argas not
subject to regular inundation from navigable waters outside the reach
of the Corps' jurisdiction.
In the 1972 Amendments, in an attempt to regulate companies
discharging pollutants on small, nonnavigable tributaries, Congress asserted jurisdiction over "the waters of the United States."'49 Although
the Act simply equated this term with "navigable waters," 50 the legislative history made plain that Congress intended a dramatic expansion
in federal jurisdiction. 5 EPA quickly embraced a broad jurisdiction
for its permit program under section 402 of the Act, 2 but -the Corps
resisted--despite the fact that the same statutory terms governed the
jurisdiction of both permit programs.53 To the Corps, section 404 was
simply an exemption from the new EPA permit system for its preexisting regulatory program.
44. The foundation case is The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871) (waters are navigable in fact "when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or uniting with other waters, a
continued highway" in the chain of interstate and foreign commerce). Although waters located entirely
within one state may still be capable of carrying interstate commerce, see 33 C.F.R. § 329.7 (1987),
some courts have demanded a demonstrable connection with interstate waterborne commerce. Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1979) (inland Minnesota lake not

navigable).
45. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
46. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
47. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); Weiszmann v. District
Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Moretti, 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976). See
Note, Section 10 of the Rivers and HarborsAct. JurisdictionShoreward of Mean High Tide Line, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 697 (1977).
48. 33 C.F.R. § 329.11-.12 (1987).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982).
50. Id. See also id. §§ 1321, 1322.
51. The Conference Report intended navigable waters to be given the broadest possible interpretation unencumbered by prior or future agency determinations made for administrative purposes. S.
REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1972). The Senate Report expressly stated that the Act
extended the definition of navigable waters because "[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 77
(1971). See also 118 CONG. RE{C.33,756-57 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Dingell), cited with approval in
United States v. Ashland Oils Transportation Co., 540 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (federal jurisdiction
extends to a nonnavigable tributary of a nonnavigable tributary of a navigable water).
52. See the definition of "navigable waters" promulgated by EPA in early 1973 in U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency General Counsel Opinion (Feb. 6, 1973).
53. Compare id. with 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 12,119 (1974) (Corps' regulations).
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D. NRDC v. Callaway and Its Aftermath
The Corps' narrow interpretation of the reach of section 404 was
quickly rejected by some courts, 54 and in response to a suit by the
National Resources Defense Council and the National Wildlife Federation, the District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the
Corps to revise its regulations to reflect the full regulatory mandate

contained in the 1972 Amendments." Two years, one political furor,
and several congressional hearings later, the Corps complied with the
court's order. 56 However, to reduce the administrative burden of expanded jurisdiction, the Corps included a "general permitting" mechanism enabling classes of activities with insignificant impacts to be
authorized without individual permit processing. 7 General permits
have become an enduring, albeit controversial, aspect of the 404
program.58
Another fallout of the Callaway litigation was the impetus it supplied to promulgate the "guidelines" Congress authorized in section
404(b) to supply the substantive criteria for 404 permit decisions. 59
Because the 404(b) guidelines were to be promulgated by EPA "in
conjunction with" the Corps, disagreements between EPA and the
Corps over their function and content delayed their issuance for nearly
three years.' However, on September 5, 1975, EPA finally published
54. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (conducting detailed
examination of the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments and concluding that they extended
federal jurisdiction to all waters that might affect commerce, without regard to traditional navigability
tests).
55. NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) (invalidating 33 C.F.R.
§§ 209.210(d)(1), 209.260 (1974)). The Callaway suit became necessary when the Corps refused. to
revise its regulations to reflect decisions like Holland.
56. Unhappy with the Callaway result, the Corps issued a press release warning that the regulations the court was forcing upon it would require permits from "the rancher who wants to enlarge his
stock pond, or the farmer who wants to deepen an irrigation ditch or. plow a field, or the mountaineer
who wants to protect his land against stream erosion." Dep't of Army, Office of Chief of Engineers,
Press Release (May 6, 1975), reprinted in Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 517
(1976). On the subsequent political furor, see Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water? The Controversy Over Section 404, Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV.
445 (1977) (detailed analysis of congressional reaction to Callaway). The Corps responded to the Callaway decision by promulgating interim final regulations on July 25, 1975, to take effect in three phases
over two years. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975); see Comment, Corps Issues Interim Rules for Discharges of
Dredged or Fill Materials, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,143 (1975).
57. 40 Fed. Reg. at 31,335 (1975) (previously codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(i)(2Xix) (1976)).
58. See infra notes 68, 72, 93-96, 102 and accompanying text and part II.C.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (1982) (guidelines to be based on "criteria comparable" to the ocean
discharge criteria authorized by § 403(c) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c)).
60. The Corps, never really accepting EPA's oversight function, believed that the guidelines
should be merely advisory and the principal litmus for permit issuance should remain its public interest
review. See supra note 31. EPA wanted the guidelines recognized as regulatory and binding on the
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guidelines that, in addition to listing considerations and objectives
governing permit processing and guiding evaluation of the effects of
proposed discharges of dredged and fill material, established a pathbreaking presumption against wetland fills unless an activity was water
dependent or other sites or construction alternatives were
impracticable. 6 '
While Callaway produced a good deal of administrative activity,
its chief legacy was to activate congressional interest in the 404 program. For two years, between 1975 and 1977, Congress debated the
program's future. 62 At one point in 1976, the House of Representatives voted to confine 404 jurisdiction to traditionally navigable waters
and adjacent wetlands. 6' The Senate, however, sought to maintain
broad federal jurisdiction but to authorize EPA, rather than the
Corps, to issue 404 permits in areas beyond traditional Rivers and
Harbors Act jurisdiction."M Neither approach succeeded, and the 94th
Congress adjourned in 1976 leaving the fate of the 404 program
unresolved.6 5
E. The 1977 Clean Water Act Amendments
Congressional attempts to restrict 404 jurisdiction ultimately
failed, as the 1977 Amendments reaffirmed program coverage over all
waters of the United States. 66 Nevertheless, the amendments reCorps. The net result of this disagreement was that the 1975 interim guidelines evaded the issue, leaving it unresolved. An example of the ambiguities in the guidelines was the strong suggestion (or weak
directive) that discharges disrupting the aquatic food chain, destroying significant wetlands, degrading
water quality, or damaging fish or shellfish populations were to be "avoid[ed]." 40 Fed. Reg. 41,295
(1975).
61. See 40 Fed. Reg. 41,292-98 (1975) (interim final guidelines).
62. See generally Caplin, supra note 56, at 457-90.
63. Id. at 460-66 (discussing the "Wright Amendment" to H.R. 9560, which passed the House
234-121 on June 3, 1976, in response to Congressman Wright's analogy of 404 governmental overregulation to government abuses leading to the signing of the Magna Carta). This amended bill would also
have (1) eliminated historically navigable waters, see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text, from
the definition of navigable waters; (2) allowed the Corps and the governor of a state to authorize 404
regulation in areas other than navigable waters and adjacent wetlands; (3) enabled the Corps to approve
any or all of 404 regulation upon finding it to be in the "public interest"; (4) authorized Corps general
permits; (5) and excluded from regulation "normal" farming, forestry and ranching activities, other
minor activities (including construction of irrigation ditches), and discharges in connection with congressionally authorized projects. Caplin, supra note 56, at 460-66.
64. Id. at 480-89 (discussing the "Baker-Randolph Amendment," which passed the Senate by
voice vote on Sept. 1, 1976). This bill also would have (I) authorized EPA approval of state 404
programs; (2) authorized general permits for activities with minor environmental effects; and (3) exempted from regulatory coverage "normal" farming, forestry and ranching activities, as well as other
activities, including irrigation ditches.
65. Id. at 489-90 (describing a deadlock in the Conference Committee).
66. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982)). See Thompson, Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend.
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sponded to many of the critics of 404 regulation by (1) exempting two
categories of activities from the program;67 (2) ratifying the Corps'
practice of issuing general permits;6 8 and (3) authorizing EPA to approve state programs in areas beyond traditional Rivers and Harbors
Act jurisdiction.6 9
Each of these concessions to overregulation concerns was limited,
however. Congress restricted the exemption for activities with minor
aquatic impacts, such as normal farming, forestry, and ranching activities, to operations that do not convert wetlands to a new use.7 Similarly, the Act's exemption for federal activities was only for
specifically authorized federal activities entirely planned, financed, and
constructed by a federal agency, and only if the lead agency prepared
an adequate environmental impact statement specifically evaluating
the project in light of the 404(b) guidelines. 7 ' Congress ratified the
general permit concept, but with accompanying restrictions limiting
its use to activities (1) of a similar nature, (2) with minimal individual
and cumulative impacts, and (3) that comply with the 404(b) guidelines.7 2 Finally, the 1977 Amendments gave EPA, not the Corps, the
responsibility for approving state permit programs, and Congress prescribed a detailed set of criteria for states to meet, including issuing
permits in compliance with the 404(b) guidelines and expressly authorizing U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service review of both state programs
73
and state-issued permits.
In addition to endorsing broad program jurisdiction, the 1977
Amendments provided the first statutory mention of wetlands and
supplied extensive legislative history confirming the 404 program's
ments of 1977: Hydrologic Modification, Wetlands Protection, and the Physical Integrity of the Nation's
Waters, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 264 (1977); Note, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Midcourse Corrections in the Section 404 Program, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1092 (1978).
67. 91 Stat. at 1600-01, 1605 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f), (r)). See infro notes 157-187 and
accompanying text.
68. 91 Stat. at 1600-1601 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
nying text.
69. Id. at 1601-03 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
nying text.

§ 1344(e)); see

infra notes 189-204 and accompa-

§ 1344(g), (h), (i)); see infra

notes 207-214 and accompa-

70. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (requiring permits for discharges "incidental to any activity having as
its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject,
where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of such waters

reduced").
71.

Id. § 1344(r); see 404 Program Perspective, supra note 40, at 424-28.

72. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (authorizing general permits on a state, regional, or nationwide basis for
up to five years); see 404 Program Perspective, supra note 40, at 430-32.
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(g), (h), (i); see 404 Program Perspective, supra note 40, at 454-60 (state
program criteria).
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role in wetlands protection.7 4 The amendments also arguably ratified
the presumption against wetland fills contained in the 404(b) guidelines75 and clearly expanded the role of the guidelines.76 Further, the
amendments reinforced the notion that the 404 program is one built
on shared agency powers: They expanded EPA's oversight role to include state programs; they preserved its role as promulgator of the
404(b) guidelines; and they maintained its veto authority over Corpsissued permits under section 404(c).77 The Corps retained its role as
permit issuer, while the states were afforded the opportunity to displace Corps regulation in traditionally nonnavigable waters. 78 Finally,
the 1977 Amendments explicitly recognized the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service as a review agency, although they did include provisions to
speed commenting and reduce delays in permit processing.79 Congress
thus consciously ratified a 404 program characterized by power
sharing.8 0
F. EPA-Corps Relations, 1977-81: Stabilizing Program
Implementation
When it became clear that Congress would not restrict the geographic scope of section 404, the Corps promulgated amended regulations implementing the program.8" These regulations included a
revised definition of wetlands that extended federal jurisdiction to ar74. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g). On the legislative history, see Myhrum, Federal Protection of Wetlands
Through the Legislative Process, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L. REv. 567, 620-25 (1979).
75. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. 121, 137 (1985) ("[a] refusal by Congress to overrule an agency's construction of legislation is at
least some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative
construction has been brought to Congress' attention through legislation specifically designed to supplant it").
76. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
77. See supra notes 41-42, 73 and accompanying text.
78. The notion that states could assume permit responsibility only in areas outside traditional
Corps Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdiction first surfaced in the "Administration Bill" proposed by
President Ford in 1976 and was carried over in the "Baker Amendment." See Caplin, supra note 56, at
472, 479; see also id. at 482 n. 101 (discussing Senator Muskie's understanding of the extent of state
jurisdiction).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(m) (Fish and Wildlife Service comments required to be submitted to the
Corps within 90 days); § 1344(q) (authorizing memoranda of agreement between the Corps and EPA,
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and Transportation, and other appropriate federal agencies, in order to minimize delays in permit processing). These § 404(q) agreements became
controversial. See infra notes 93, 97, 103-104, 260-266 and accompanying text. On the role of the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service in the federal program, see 404
Program Perspective, supra note 40, at 442-45.
80. Or, using Professor Rodgers's words, "multiple loci of decisional power." 2 W. RODGERS,
supra note 14, § 4.12, at 185; see also supra text accompanying note 14.
81. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,133 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-329 (1988); revised by
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206-60 (1986)).
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eas inundated either by surface or groundwater and containing a
"prevalence" of vegetation "typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions." 8 2 The regulations also adopted the presumption against
filling wetlands initiated by EPA's 1975 404(b) guidelines, 83 although
of the presumption to wetthe regulations limited the applicability
a4
lands considered "important.

8

Because Congress simply left unchanged the jurisdictional provisions of the Act in the 1977 Amendments, whether EPA or the Corps
possessed final authority to interpret the geographic scope of the program remained unclear. Consequently, the Secretary of the Army formally requested an Attorney General's opinion on the issue. On
September 5, 1979, Attorney General Civiletti concluded that EPA,
not the Corps, had final authority over all jurisdictional questions
under the Clean Water Act, including section 404.8' This interpreta,tion, subsequently confirmed by the courts,8 6 established EPA as the
ultimate interpreter of the scope of 404 regulation.
On December 24, 1980, EPA published revised 404(b) guidelines.8 7 Perhaps emboldened by the Attorney General's opinion, the
1980 revision not only restated the presumption against wetland alterations for nonwater dependent uses or where site or construction alternatives were available, but expanded it to include "special aquatic
sites" such as important fish and wildlife habitats, marine sanctuaries,
and refuges.8 8 The 1980 guidelines also imposed a burden of proof
against proposed discharges, stipulating that "dredged or fill material
82. Id. at 37,144 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.1(b) (1988)). This amendment expanded 404 jurisdiction over areas with wetland vegetation that failed to satisfy the previous requirement of being "periodically inundated." See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 910-13 (5th Cir.

1983).
83. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
84. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,137 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R.

§ 320.4(b)(4)

(1988)). The

original language required Corps District Engineers to "'consider whether the proposed activity is primarily dependent on being located in, or in close proximity to, the aquatic environment and whether
feasible alternatives are available." Id.
85. 43 Op. Atty. Gen. 15 (1979), summarized in [10 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA)
1278-79 (Oct. 5, 1979) [hereinafter Civiletti Attorney General Opinion] (the overall structure of the
Clean Water Act impliedly places responsibility on EPA to determine the scope of "navigable waters"
for the entire statute). However, subsequent to the Civiletti opinion, EPA and the Corps signed a
memorandum of understanding allowing the Corps to make wetlands jurisdiction determinations unless
EPA identifies an area as a "special case." See Barton 1, supra note 28, at 233 (noting bottomland
hardwoods and a California bay as designated "special cases").
86. See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 903 n.12 (5th Cir. 1983);
Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 700 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); In Re Alameda County Assessor's Parcels, 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1285 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
87. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,336-357 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1988)); see generally Liebesman,
The Role of EPA's Guidelines in the Clean Water Act § 404 Permit Program-JudicialInterpretation
and Administrative Application, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,272 (1984).
88. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.3, 230.10 (1988).
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should not be discharged into the aquatic ecosystem unless it can be
demonstrated that such a discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse impact."" 9 Moreover, EPA expressly declared that the guidelines were "regulatory," not advisory, in nature-meaning that they
were binding on the Corps-and announced that they were an independent basis for prohibiting discharges, apart from the Corps' public interest review. 90
G. Regulatory Relief and the National Wildlife Federation
Settlement: Destabilizing Program Implementation
The election of Ronald Reagan brought new challenges to 404
implementation, as the 404 program was quickly targeted for "reform" by the President's Task Force on Regulatory Reform in August
1981.9! The Task Force's report, along with promulgation of Executive Order No. 12,291 requiring regulatory impact analysis, 92 encouraged the Corps to consider measures to expedite permit
processing and expand the use of nationwide permits.9 3 An enlarged
nationwide permit program was promulgated in July 1982,94 an initiative that produced considerable controversy9" and led sixteen environmental groups to file suit in National Wildlife Federationv. Marsh 96 to
89. Id. § 230.1(c).
90. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,336 (1980) (preamble).
91. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY REFORM, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS TO
THE REGULATORY PROGRAM UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND SECTION 10 OF
THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT (May 7, 1982), described at 48 Fed. Reg. 21,466 (1983); see also
Section 404 Faces Test, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 2. In response to a request for
comments from the Task Force, the American Petroleum Institute ranked the 404 program second in
its "hit list" of burdensome regulatory programs. COASTAL ZONE MGMT. NEWSL., Jan. 13, 1982, at 1.
92. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); see Comment, Reagan Orders Cost-Benefit Analysis of Regulations, Confers Broad Powers on O.MB. and Regulatory Task Force, II Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,044 (1981).

93. Actually, the Corps began considering these reforms prior to the completion of the Task
Force report in May 1982. See Corps Reviews § 404, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 67. In addition to expanding the use of nationwide permits, the Task Force recommended (1) revising
404(q) memoranda of agreement to streamline permit processing and to reduce interagency appeals; (2)
increasing reliance on state programs by issuing general permits where states have regulatory programs
substantially similar to the Corps'; (3) "simplifying" the 404(b) guidelines and shortening the time for
state action on water quality certification requests to "reduce policy conflicts"; and (4) redefining wetlands to "clarify" the program's scope. See Barton I, supra note 28, at 240; see also Gianelli, Regulatory
Reform Equals Good Government, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1983, at 6-7.
94. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (1982) (interim final regulations, including 27 nationwide permits).
95. See, e.g., Parish & Morgan, supra note 9; Blumm, supra note 10.
96. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, No. 82-3632 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 22, 1982); See Environmen-

tal Organizations Sue to Undo Reagan Administration Changes in Section 404 Program, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 4-6. The major concern of the environmental groups was the
proposed use of nationwide permits for isolated waters (waters not part of a surface tributary system
and adjacent wetlands) and waters above the "headwaters" (where there is less than five cubic feet per
second mean annual flow and adjacent wetlands). Prior to promulgation of the new regulations, the
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enjoin its implementation. Also in 1982, the Corps signed new memoranda of agreement under section 404(q) with the federal fishery agencies and EPA to speed permit processing that sharply curbed
opportunities for administrative appeals and effectively reduced mitigation measures in permit conditions.9 7 In May 1983 the Corps proposed even more drastic reforms in regulations that would have
substantially revised the entire program, omitting any reference to the
404(b) guidelines and reversing the presumption against wetland discharges by stating that "a permit will be granted unless its issuance is
found to be contrary to the public interest." 98 At the same time, the
Corps waged a battle within the Administration to have the 404(b)
guidelines declared to be advisory, not regulatory. 99
But regulatory reform efforts reached their high water mark with
the 1983 Corps proposal. First, when William Ruckelshaus became
EPA Administrator in 1983, he identified the 404 program as a high
agency priority, resisted changes to the guidelines, and maintained
their regulatory status. " Second, the parties in the National Wildlife
Federation suit agreed to a settlement in February 1984 in which the
Corps promised to promulgate new regulations (1) acknowledging the
mandatory nature of the 404(b) guidelines; (2) preserving the presumption against wetland discharges; (3) applying the decision in
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh '0 1-which extended 404 reguCorps required an individual permit in isolated waters with a surface area of ten acres or larger. The
change, according to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, would remove individual permit requirements
from 700,000 to 900,000 acres of prairie potholes, one to two million lakes and wetlands in the upper
Midwest, 335,000 acres of wetlands adjacent to the Great Salt Lake, and 70% of the lakes in Alaska.
See Barton 1, supra note 28, at 243. The environmental groups alleged that the new permits were
inconsistent with § 404(e), which authorizes general permits only for categories of activities, not for
classes of waters or wetlands, and then only if there are minimal cumulative impacts. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(e)(2) (1982).
97. Prior to 1982, the 404(q) memoranda enabled EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
National Marine Fisheries Service to request further review of Corps District Engineer permit decisions
by higher authorities in the Corps (and ultimately by the Secretary of the Army). Although four levels
of appeal .were possible, in practice few permit "elevations" occurred, largely because the threat of
delays in permit issuance encouraged applicants to incorporate satisfactory mitigation measures. The
1982 memoranda (I) made elevation possible only where there was insufficient interagency coordination, significant new information, or national policy concern (not because of a discharge's environmental effects); (2) provided for only one level of appeal; and (3) made all permit elevation decisions
discretionary with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. See generally Barton I,supra
note 28, at 240-42; Barton, Federal Wetlands Protection Programs, in THE AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORT 1986, at 396 (Nat'l Audubon Soc'y ed. 1986) [hereinafter Barton I1].
98. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,466, 21,469 (1983). See Liebesman, supra note 87, at 10,275-76 (discussing
EPA's objections to the Corps' proposals); Nagle, Wetlands Protection and the Neglected Stepchild of
the Clean Water Act: A Proposalfor Shared Custody ofSection 404, 5 VA. J.NAT. RESOURCES L. 227,
241-45 (1985).
99. See generally Liebesman, supra note 87, at 10,274-75.
100. Id. at 10,275; Barton I, supra note 28, at 244; Barton II, supra note 97, at 392-93.
101. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
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latory coverage over agricultural clearing, drainage, and channeling of
wetlands-nationwide; (4) reinstating a ten-acre limit in the isolated
waters and "headwaters" nationwide permits; (5) including a predischarge notification for activities causing the "loss or substantial modification" of from one to ten acres; and (6) requiring the Corps to seek
the views of EPA and fish and wildlife agencies concerning proposed
discharges affecting one to ten acres of special aquatic sites.' 0 2 Third,
largely due to congressional pressure, 0 3 the Corps agreed to revise the
404(q) memoranda of agreement, in order to provide increased flexibility in the timing of permit issuance and increased consultation at the
Corps District Engineer level, greater opportunities to request administrative appeals (including noncompliance with the 404(b) guidelines),
and a requirement that the Corps supply a written, reasoned decision
when denying requests for appeals.'a
Thus, many of the Corps' regulatory reform initiatives were ultimately frustrated by congressional opposition, resistance of EPA and
the federal fishery agencies, and the willingness of environmental
groups to challenge the Corps in court. Current Corps regulations,
issued on November 13, 1986, reflect the compromises reached in the
National Wildlife Federation settlement, 10 5 although they fail expressly to assert jurisdiction over all "waters of the United States" that
could supply habitat for migratory birds 0 6 and assume that dredging
operations (such as those the Corps itself conducts) 7do not involve
0
discharges and therefore do not require 404 permits.'
When Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987, it made
only minor changes in section 404's enforcement authorities.'0 8 Nevertheless, a number of unresolved issues continue to hamper 404 im102. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,262, 20,263-64 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1984) (paragraphs 12,
16, and 25 of settlement agreement). See Liebesman, supra note 87, at 10,275; Barton I, supra note 28,
at 243-44; Barton II, supra note 97, at 390-92; Court Approves Settlement Agreement in NWF v. Marsh,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 4.
103. Senators Chaffee and Mitchell blocked Robert Dawson's nomination for Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Civil Works until the Corps agreed to revise the memoranda. Barton I, supra note 97,
at 395-96.
104. Id. at 397.
105. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-330 (1988)). SeeArmy Issues Final
Clean Water Act § 404 Regulations, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan-Feb. 1987, at 8-10. However, the
National Wildlife Federation unsuccessfully challenged a "grandfather" provision in the regulations
allowing discharges previously authorized under nationwide permits to continue for 18 months under
certain conditions. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(c) (1988). The court upheld the grandfather clause as allowing for "a reasonable, fair transition." National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1417, 1420 (D.D.C. 1984).
106. See infra note 139.
107. 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,210.
108. Pub. L. No. 100-4 § 313(d) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982)). See infra notes 339, 382388 and accompanying text.
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plementation, including whether the Corps must accept EPA's
interpretation of the 404(b) guidelines, and whether the Corps can determine on a case-by-case basis not to require permits of discharges
into small waterbodies connected to a surface tributary system (isolated waters). Neither the National Wildlife Federation settlement nor
the revised 404(q) memoranda resolved these issues, which are discussed further in the succeeding sections. 10 9
II. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

The issues of which waters and which activities are subject to 404
regulation have been at the heart of most of the controversy surrounding the program. Geographic jurisdiction concerns the scope of the
Clean Water Act's intent to assert regulatory control over all waters to
the limits of the constitution's commerce clause '0 -that is, all waters
affecting interstate and foreign commerce. Because of its constitutional dimension, this issue is ultimately a matter for judicial interpretation. Jurisdiction over activities, on the other hand, involves a
greater degree of administrative discretion. But here, too, the courts
play an important role in ascertaining congressional intent.
A. Geographic Jurisdiction
In the wake of the Callaway decision,"' the Corps promulgated
final rules in 1977 expanding its jurisdiction to include not only wetlands adjacent to navigable waters but also wetlands adjacent to other
waters, interstate wetlands, and intrastate wetlands "which could affect" interstate or foreign commerce." 2 In effect, this expansion of
jurisdiction, which remains essentially unchanged today," 13 seemed to
assert federal control over all wetlands, since all wetlands arguably
could affect interstate commerce. However, while the Supreme Court
ratified Clean Water Act jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands, the
Corps has declined to assert jurisdiction over all wetlands not adjacent
to other waters, claiming the right to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether a permit should be required.
109. See infra notes 138-150, 290-291 and accompanying text.

110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
111. NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). See supra part I.D.
112. 51 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (1977) (formerly codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a); now codified
as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1988)).
113. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
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1. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes and the Extent of
Wetlands Jurisdiction
In its first consideration of section 404, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a narrow construction of Clean Water Act jurisdiction by the Sixth Circuit that required "frequent flooding" of
wetlands. " 4 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes concerned a fill
in a tract of marshy land near Lake St. Clair, Michigan, which the
Corps considered an "adjacent wetland" requiring a 404 permit because of its vegetation and saturated soils. The Sixth Circuit disagreed
with the Corps' jurisdictional determination, worrying that such broad
federal jurisdiction could produce an unconstitutional taking of
property." 15
The Supreme Court rejected as "spurious" the appellate court's
takings clause concerns, concluding that its narrow construction
avoided no constitutional difficulty but frustrated application of Clean
Water Act regulation." t6 Unencumbered by the takings issue, the
Court considered the case as one of simple statutory and regulatory
construction: whether the area at issue was a wetland under the Corps
regulations and, if so, whether the Clean Water Act authorized the
Corps to assert jurisdiction over such an area. Pointing to the Corps'
expanded definition of wetlands in its 1977 regulations," r 7 Justice
White concluded that in fashioning its "frequent flooding" requirement the Sixth Circuit improperly second-guessed the Corps on a jurisdictional question its regulations specifically sought to resolve.""
Since the regulations asserted jurisdiction over wetlands dependent on
groundwater, frequent flooding by an adjacent waterbody was clearly
unnecessary and inconsistent with the "plain language" of the regulations.1" As for whether Congress authorized Corps jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to but not regularly flooded by "more conventionally identified waters," the Court held the Corps' regulatory definition
to be reasonable in light of the language, policies, and legislative his114. 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (reversing the Sixth Circuit's ruling, 729 F.2d 391, 397-398 (6th Cir.
1984), that it was not clear that Congress intended "navigable waters" to include bays, swamps, and
marshes that are "rarely if ever flooded").
115. 729 F.2d at 397-98.
116. 474 U.S. at 128 (noting that "so long as compensation is available for those whose property
is in fact taken" by regulation, the assertion of jurisdiction itself cannot be unconstitutional). See First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (compensation
available for temporary regulatory taking).
117. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
118. 474 U.S. at 130.
119. Id. at 129. The Court thus affirmed the district court's conclusion that the wetland was an
adjacent wetland within the terms of the Corps' regulations because of its wetland vegetation and saturated soil from groundwater. Id. at 130-31 (district court's determination not "clearly erroneous").
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tory of the Act.' 20 Influencing the Court were the clear congressional
intention to extend federal jurisdiction beyond traditionally navigable
waters, ' 2' the repeated failure of attempts to amend the Act to restrict
Corps' jurisdiction, 22 and reference to wetlands at two places in the
Act, indicating congressional concern for the resource. 123
Riverside Bayview thus confirmed federal jurisdiction over wetlands "adjacent" to other waterbodies, affirming the Corps' ecologically based definition of wetlands.' 24 This result is hardly surprising,
since Congress clearly intended to regulate all waterbodies affecting
interstate commerce. 25 In addition, the decision will likely encourage
two trends. First, it confirms judicial approval of broad assertions of
federal jurisdiction. Recently, lower courts approved all of the following as "waters of the United States": (1) usually dry arroyos with only
occasional surface flows;' 26 (2) an isolated lake; 127 (3) an isolated wet120. Id. at 134 ("In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act
itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps' ecological
judgment... provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as
waters under the Act."). Cf.Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (federal courts must defer to agency construction of statutes where the
interpretation is reasonable).
121. 474 U.S. at 133 (1972 Act demonstrates the "evident breadth of congressional concern for
protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems").
122. Id. at 137 ("Congress rejected measures designed to curb the Corps' jurisdiction in large part
because of its concern that protection of wetlands would be unduly hampered by a narrowed definition
of 'navigable waters.' ").
123. The Court cited §§ 404(g)(1), 208(i)(2), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(g)(1), 1288(i)(2) (1982). The first
provision withholds state 404 jurisdiction over traditionally navigable waters and adjacent wetlands.
The latter provision authorizes a $6 million National Wetlands Inventory to assist local, state, and
federal agencies in identifying wetlands. See Barton II, supra note 97, at 381 (reporting that the inventory had completed mapping of 40% of the lower 48 states by 1985).
124. 474 U.S. at 134-35 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)(i) (1985)). See United States v. Rivera
Torres, 656 F. Supp. 251, 254 (D.P.R. 1987) (construing Riverside Bayview to sanction federal jurisdiction based on humidity of soil and prevalence of wetland vegetation); United States v. Larkins, 657 F.
Supp. 76, 81 n.13 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (jurisdiction based on hydric soils and vegetation), aff'd, 852 F.2d
189 (6th Cir. 1988). An "adjacent" wetland is one that is bordering, contiguous to, or "neighboring"
another waterbody. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (1987). No hydrological connection is apparently required.
125. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The congressional assertion that wetland fills
substantially affect interstate commerce will be upheld if there is any rational basis for such a finding.
See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
126. Quivira Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985)
("It is the intent of the Clean Water Act to cover, as much as possible, all waters of the United States
instead of just some.").
127. Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984) (isolated lake, which provided migratory
waterfowl habitat, recreational opportunities for interstate travelers, and irrigation and commercial
fishery habitat, where crops and fish both were marketed in interstate commerce, was within the Corps'
jurisdiction); see Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Gen. Counsel, to
Richard E. Sanderson, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Acting Ass't, Office of External Affairs, entitled
"Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Over Isolated Waters" (Sept. 12, 1985) [hereinafter EPA Memorandum
on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Over Isolated Waters].
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land;"'2 8 (4) wetlands adjacent to a recreational lake used by interstate
travelers;' 2 9 (5) private lands flooded by a federal dam; 130 (6) artificial
wetlands;' 3 ' (7) a mangrove forest; 3 2 and (8) bottomland hardwoods.' 33 Second, Riverside Bayview will continue a very deferential
judicial attitude toward the government's jurisdictional determinations. 13 4 Although the Corps' administrative record on permit applications must demonstrate a thorough study of an area's soils,
hydrology, and vegetation, 35 courts are even more deferential to the
government's experts when the government seeks to enjoin an unau128. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher (Pond 12), 662 F. Supp. 548, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
("[A] wetland visited by migratory birds is a wetland within the jurisdiction of the [EPA and the
Corps]."), discussed infra notes 143-149 and accompanying text.
129. United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979); Bailey v. United States, 647 F. Supp.
44 (D. Idaho 1986).
130. Swanson v. United States, 789 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The public right of navigation follows the stream ... and the authority of Congress goes with it," quoting Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 634-35 (1912)); see also Ninth Circuit Ruling on Corps Regulatory Jurisdiction,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 14; cf Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 700 F. Supp.
476, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (actions by the Corps itself that create conditions on private property that
could subject that property to Clean Water Act jurisdiction may not be considered).
131. United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 492-494 (D.N.J. 1984):
Although the court is... fascinated by the history of the site ...for purposes of the present
controversy that history is of purely scientific value and is not dispositive of the legal issues
before the court.... [Flederal jurisdiction is determined by whether the site is presently
wetlands and not by how it came to be wetlands.
See also United States v. Akers, 651 F. Supp. 320, 323 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (statutory and administrative
definitions of "'waters' and 'wetlands' are broad enough to encompass so called 'man-made' wetlands"); Bailey v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 44 (D. Idaho 1986); Track 12, Inc. v. District Eng'r, 618
F. Supp. 448 (D. Minn. 1985).
132. United States v. Rivera Torres, 656 F. Supp. 251 (D.P.R. 1987).
133. United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988).
134. See, e.g., Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Marsh, 736 F.2d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 1984)
("Case law binds [the courts] to uphold the Corps' decision" regarding what alternatives to discuss in
an EIS unless decision is "arbitrary and capricious"); Avoyelles Sportmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d
897, 905 (5th Cir. 1983) (Corps' decisions to grant or deny § 404 permits reviewed "under the arbitrary
and capricious standard on the basis of the administrative record"); Habicht, Implementing Section
404: The View From the Justice Department, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,073, 10,077 (1986)
(arguing that judicial restraint and deference to administrative determination is "critical" to the success
of any regulatory program); but see U.S. v. Brassey, No. 81-1072 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 1982) ("What is
required in the opinion of this Court is that an area be saturated or inundated by water with sufficient
regularity that an ordinary person would understand that the prev[a]lent vegetation is indicative of a
normally aquatic environment") (emphasis added), quoted in Ortman, Wetlands Or Uplands-Northwest Courts Make the Call, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., May-June 1986, at 13, 14.
135. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (visual observation
not adequate); see also District Court Sets Aside Corps Wetlands Determination, NAT'I. WETLANDS
NEWSL., May-June 1986, at 14-15. However, the Corps is not required to give permit applicants an
adjudicatory hearing. Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1175 (5th Cir. 1982) (Congress "did not
intend that the 'public hearings' called for in section 404 be trial-type hearings on the record"); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("section 404 requires only...
a 'speech-making hearing' at which 'proponents and opponents of [a] project are allowed to be heard,' "
quoting Buttrey, 690 F.2d at 1176). See also Section 404 Permit Program Survives Legal Challenges.
Faces Congressional and Administrative Review, I I Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,233. 10.237
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thorized discharge, a situation where no prior administrative record
exists. 136 However, the Corps must make "reasoned" jurisdictional
decisions, and citizens may challenge wetland37 determinations under
the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision.
2. The Pond 12 Case and Jurisdiction Over Nonadjacent
Wetlands
Riverside Bayview did not resolve all questions concerning 404's
geographic jurisdiction. The Court expressly reserved judgment on
the issue of nonadjacent wetland jurisdiction, 38 and EPA and the
Corps have differing views on the subject. EPA believes that Clean
Water Act jurisdiction extends to all wetlands that could potentially
supply habitat for migratory birds.' 3 9 This would effectively assert
(1981). Nor is the Corps required to provide an informal hearing unless one is requested during the
comment period. AJA Assocs. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 817 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1987).
136. United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 431 (11 th Cir. 1983) (district court's injunction based
on the Corps' conclusion that the swamp at issue was a wetland was "not clearly erroneous"); United
States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366, 370 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (in a hearing for injunctive relief where no
administrative record exists, "the court must give substantial deference to the well reasoned conclusions
of those Government witnesses who are officials charged by law with administering the provisions of
the Clean Water Act"); United States v. Lee Wood Contracting, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 119, 120 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (government provided "ample evidence" that the parcel at issue was a wetland within the
Corps' jurisdiction requiring a permit). James Tripp has cautioned that such deference should not,
however, limit discovery and evidentiary review before a trial court has an opportunity to evaluate
material facts and witness credibility and ensure that the written record is not a mere fabrication supporting the government's jurisdictional conclusion. Tripp, Judicial Review of§ 404 Wetlands Protection Actions: A Reaction, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,096 (1984).
137. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,509, 21,510 (4th
Cir. 1988) (Corps has "a mandatory duty to ascertain the relevant facts, correctly construe the applicable statutes and regulations, and properly apply the law to the facts"); see Ransel, The Swamps-On-AHill Have Citizens on a Roll: The Fourth Circuit Advances the Citizens' Cause in National Wildlife
Federation v. Hanson, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 (1989); cf Golden Gate Audubon
Soc'y v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 700 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Corps' jurisdictional decisions reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act; thus incorrect Corps conclusion that permitless fills could establish a site's normal condition for jurisdictional purposes was
reviewable).
138. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 125 n.2 (1985). See Meyer, Navigating the Wetlands Jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers, RESOURCE LAW NOTES (Nat. Resources L. Center), Aug. 1986, at 3, 5 (criticizing the Court for unnecessarily continuing the tortured
development of wetlands jurisdiction and noting, "While the Corps has edged along what it perceived
as a constitutional tightrope, it has in fact been treading solid constitutional ground. Only poor vision
and an apparent failure to read the case law made the ground seem so far away."). For other evaluations of Riverside Bayview, see Adams, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.: Wetlands, Fish,
or Waterfowl?, 32 LOYOLA L. REV. 477 (1986); Rosenbaum, The Supreme Court Endorses a Broad
Reading of Corps Wetland Jurisdiction Under FWPCA § 404, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,008
(1986); Significant Development, The Clean Water Act-More Section 404: The Supreme Court Gets Its
Feet Wet, 65 B.U.L. REV. 995 (1985).
139. See EPA Memorandum on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Over Isolated Waters, supra note
127; see also 53 Fed. Reg. 20,764, 20,765 (1988) (discussing the memorandum). The Corps sent this
memorandum to its field staff under pressure from Congress, see Barton II, supra note 97, at 399, and
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federal jurisdiction over all wetlands-both adjacent to other waterbodies and nonadjacent-as a class.' 4 o However, the Corps maintains
it must make jurisdictional determinations for such areas on a case-bycase basis by analyzing each area's connection to interstate commerce. 14 1 As a result, the Corps has acquiesced in a number of fills of
nonadjacent wetlands, especially playa lakes in the Great Basin and
prairie potholes in the Northern Great Plains, by not asserting
jurisdiction. 4 2
The Corps' authority to decline jurisdiction over a relatively large
nonadjacent wetland was recently affirmed by a district court in a case
known as Pond 12.143 National Wildlife Federation v. Laubscher
(Pond 12) originated in January 1984, and involved a 30-acre permanently inundated playa lake in Texas. When officials of the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service observed a channelization operation taking place
without a 404 permit,' 44 they requested that the Corps issue a cease
and desist order. The Corps declined, claiming its jurisdiction over
isolated waters was "limited and not clearly defined."'41 Although the
Service proceeded to document use of Pond 12 by some fifty species of
waterfowl protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Corps refused to assert jurisdiction, EPA did nothing, and Pond 12 was subsequently destroyed.
The National Wildlife Federation then filed suit, seeking to force
the Corps and EPA to assert jurisdiction over all wetlands satisfying
the regulatory definition and a declaration that all such wetlands are
within the commerce clause power. The Corps conceded that it incormade reference to its conclusions in the preamble to its current regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217
(1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1988)), but did not alter its wetlands definition, id. at 41,250 (33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)).
140. See Jackson, The Constitutional Test for Wetlands Jurisdiction:Agencies in a Muddle, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 7 (arguing that, since wetland fills as a class have a substantial
affect on interstate commerce, all wetlands satisfying the soil, hydrology, and vegetation factors in the
regulatory definition should be subject to 404 regulation).
141. See id. (noting that EPA and the Corps presume that all "adjacent" wetlands affect interstate
commerce, but require an individual showing of effects on commerce for "nonadjacent" wetlands);
Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause. The Constitutionality of Current Wetland Regulation
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 307, 320-27 (1988) (arguing

that the "adjacency test" is inconsistent with congressional intent, constitutional power, and scientific
rationale).
142. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 141, at 329-34 (cataloging numerous instances where wetlands
have been excluded from 404 jurisdiction, including a 330-acre playa lake in Texas and 200 acres of

wetlands in coastal Virginia).
143. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher (Pond 12), 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987), dis-

cussed in Jackson, supra note 141, at 327-29.
144. See generally Environmentalists Sue the Corps and EPA Over Isolated Wetlands Jurisdiction,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 13-14.
145. Id. at 14.
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rectly determined that Pond 12 was not a "water of the United States"
but maintained that it possessed discretion not to take enforcement
action against the discharge.' 4 6 In a curious decision the court decided that because the case involved the issue of federal jurisdiction it
could not be dismissed as a matter of discretionary nonenforcement.,

47

Nevertheless, the court denied the Wildlife Federation's request on the
ground that the group lacked standing to secure nationwide injunctive
relief 48
' The court also refused to order restoration of the wetland or
impose fines because neither the Corps nor EPA undertook enforcement against the discharger. 4 9 Although the Pond 12 decision upheld
the Corps' discretion to exclude nonadjacent wetlands from 404 regulation on a case-by-case basis, such decisions must be accompanied by
written records demonstrating their reasonableness, and they are judi'
cially reviewable. 50
3. The Corps-EPA Jurisdiction Memorandum of
Agreement
On January 19, 1989, EPA and the Corps signed a memorandum
of agreement (MOA) allocating jurisdictional decision-making authority between the two agencies.' 5 ' The agreement replaces a 1980 agreement signed in the wake of the Civiletti opinion that interpreted the
52
statute to give EPA final authority over section 404 jurisdiction.
Although the new MOA continues the policy of having the Corps
make most of the jurisdictional determinations, it requires that the
Corps "fully implement" EPA guidance concerning the scope of 404
jurisdiction. 5 3 Further, the MOA gives EPA the authority to make
jurisdiction determinations itself in any given case or class of cases
146. See Jackson, supra note 140.
147. 662 F. Supp. at 549-50. The court did determine that Pond 12 was a " 'water[ ] of the
United States.' " Id. (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 549.
149. Id. at 550. Cf Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh, 815 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1987)
(Corps' decision whether to compel compliance with permit conditions is an enforcement issue immune
from judicial review); Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs, 678 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Mo.
1988) (same), aff'd, 866 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1989).
150. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539 (E.D.N.C. 1985), discussed in Ransel,
supra note 137.
151.

MEMORANDUM

Of AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
JURISDICTION OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM AND THE APPLICATION OF THE EXEMPTIONS UNDER
404(f) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (Jan. 19, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 CORPs-EPA JURISDICMOA].
152. See Ransel, EPA and the Corps Enter Three MOAs on Allocation ofRegulatory Responsibilities Under the Section 404 Program, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 2. On the Civiletti
SECTION
TION

opinion, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.

153.

1989 CORPs-EPA JURISDICTION MOA, supra note 151, § I1.
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through regional lists or particular areas or categories of activities. 54
Moreover, the agreement establishes a "compliance tracking" system
that requires the Corps to supply EPA with records of all its jurisdiction determinations to enable EPA to review the extent to which the
Corps is implementing EPA guidance. 55
The jurisdiction MOA seems to give EPA the means to police
effectively the Corps' interpretation of the extent of 404 jurisdiction.
This should prevent aberrant Corps interpretations that EPA decides
to correct, but it does not require EPA to do so. And EPA has acquiesced in.
many, if not all, of the Corps' decisions not to assert jurisdiction, including Pond 12.156
B. Activities Exempt from Individual FederalPermits
Rather than restrict the geographic reach of section 404, the 1977
Amendments created a number of mechanisms to reduce the regulatory burden of the program. Exempted from permit requirements
were activities with minor effects and certain federal projects. 157 This
section considers regulatory and judicial developments concerning
these categorical exemptions.
1. Exempted Minor Activities
Section 404(f) exempts from permit requirements a number of
minor discharges thought by Congress to involve "routine activities,
small actors, temporary effects, and avoidance of duplicate regulation,"' 5 8 in six categories of minor discharges. The key exemptions
are those for (1) "normal" farming, ranching, and forestry activities,
such as plowing, minor draining, and harvesting; (2) constructing or
maintaining stock ponds or irrigation ditches or maintaining drainage
ditches; and (3) constructing or maintaining farm, forest, or mining
roads.'5 9 No exemption is available, however, for an activity that
154. Id. § I1.
155. Id. § IV(F) (lists to be proposed by regional EPA administrators and approved by the EPA
administrator).
156. See United States v. Laubscher (Pond 12), 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 144-149; see also Jackson, Wetlands and the Commerce Clause, supra
note 141, at 329-34 (discussing other cases).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f), (r) (1982).

158. 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.12, at 188. Section 404(f) was the product chiefly of
intense lobbying by groups such as the National Association of Home Builders and the National Forest
Products Association, which opposed the court-ordered expansion of regulatory jurisdiction and which

often invoked the specter of federal regulatory requirements overwhelming the family farm. See, e.g.,
id at 187 (citing Sen. Muskie during the Senate debate).
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1) (also exempting maintenance or emergency reconstruction of currently serviceable structures, construction of temporary sedimentation basins on uplands, and activities
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would violate a toxic effluent standard'6° or constitute a new use impairing the flow, circulation, or reach of waters. 61 Primary responsi62 although
bility for interpreting these exemptions rests with EPA, 163
the Corps has issued essentially identical interpretations.
The exemptions have been construed narrowly, influenced no
doubt by the knowledge that conversions of wetlands to agricultural
use accounted for roughly eighty percent of the wetland losses in the
twenty years preceding the enactment of the "normal farming" exemption."t M The Corps' regulations specify that "normal" activities
are those that are part of an "established (i.e., on-going)" operation;
they are not those that establish a new agricultural use or even return
an area farmed in the past to agriculture if hydrological modification is
required. ' 65 The exemption for minor drainage activities is inapplicable to drainage that converts wetlands to nonwetlands or significantly
modifies wetlands or other aquatic areas. 166 The regulations specify
67
those activities qualifying for the exemption for irrigation facilities.'
regulated by an approved statewide "best management practices" program authorized by § 208(b)(4) of
the Act).
160. Id. § 1344(f)(1). Because toxic effluent standards and prohibitions established under
§ 307(a)(2) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2), supersede any other less stringent requirements in a discharger's NPDES permit, Inland Steel Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 574
F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1978), this caveat to the 404(f)(l) exemptions not only brings the activities back
within the 404 permit process, but would seem to require permit denial. See Blumm, supra note 40, at
420 n.44; infra note 282 (discussing the 404(b) guidelines).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2); see Tripp & Herz, supra note 7, at 236-40 (advocating extension of
this "recapture" principle to all allegedly de minimis projects that involve a change of use).
162. See Civiletti Attorney General Opinion, supra note 85; 1989 CORps-EPA JURISDICTION
MOA, supra note 151.
EPA promulgated revised definitions of the exemptions in 1988. 40 C.F.R. § 232.3 (1988). These
regulations also attempted to resolve a longstanding disagreement between the Corps and EPA over
whether the 404 program or the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System, authorized by § 402
of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1342), should regulate discharges of solid waste into waters. See
Blumm, supra note 40, at 446-49. Under EPA's new definition of "fill material," such discharges apparently would require a 404 permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(i); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (1986)
(Memorandum of Agreement between EPA and the Corps on solid waste). However, the Corps did not
change its regulations, and the Corps and EPA have been unable to agree as to the effect of the new
memorandum of agreement. As a result, the Corps continues to exclude from the permit program solid
waste discharges such as garbage, tires, and construction rubble, the primary purpose of which is not to
replace an aquatic area or change the bottom elevation of a waterbody. Letter from Douglas A.
Thompson, Chief, Wetland Protection Section, Envtl. Protection Agency Region 1, to Michael C.
Blumm, coauthor, at 2 (Jan. 10, 1989); see also 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1988).
163. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.4 (1988) (Corps regulations).
164.

U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION

87.(1984).
165. 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(I)(ii); see also 40 C.F.R. § 233.35(a)(1)(ii) (EPA guidelines).
166. 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(l)(iii)(C)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 233.35(a)(1)(iii)(C)(2).
167. The Corps' 1982 regulations granted a § 404(f) exemption to discharges associated with
irrigation facilities. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,795, 31,812 (1982). Pursuant to the National Wildlife
Federation settlement, supra note 102 and accompanying text, the Corps clarified that only
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The courts have strongly affirmed the narrow construction of the
regulations, relying frequently on legislative history indicating that the
exemptions apply only to narrowly defined activities causing little or
no adverse effect, individually or cumulatively. 16 ' Thus, they have
ruled ineligible for the exemption conversion of a bottomland hardwood forest to a soybean field; 169 road widening, plowing, draining,
and bulldozing wetlands for cranberry, corn, and barley planting;7 0
construction of various dikes, ditches, channels, and roads to farm
wetlands; 171 and construction of fish-farming ponds. 172 However,
tree-cutting activities in connection with construction of an electric
power line through a swamp qualified for a permit exemption because
no wetlands conversion took place. 73 Nevertheless, the burden of
proof is on the applicant when an exemption is claimed.' 7 4 The case
law has also rejected attempts by dischargers to qualify for an exemption by placing artificial labels on their activities. 175 Nevertheless, fulfillment of the congressional intent to exempt only slight modifications
to areas currently used as farmland rests uneasily on the shoulders of
thousands of private actors making case-by-case
decisions about
76
whether their activities merit an exemption.
2. Exempted Federal Projects
Fearing that the executive branch might employ section 404 to
veto federally funded water projects, 177 Congress in the 1977 Amend"[d]ischarges associated with siphons, pumps, headgates, wingwalls, weirs, diversion structures, and
such other facilities as are appurtenant and functionally related to irrigation ditches" fall within the
exemption. 49 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 39,482 (1984) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(3) (1988); 40 C.F.R.
§ 233.35(a)(3) (1988)).
168. United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir.) (Senator Muskie's remarks entitled to
substantial weight), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 107 (1986); United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1241
(7th Cir. 1985); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 926 (5th Cir. 1983). Seegenerally Liebesman, The Farming Exemption Under § 404(f) ofthe Clean Water Act-Congressional Intent
and Judicial Construction, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1985, at 14-17.
169. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, 715 F.2d at 926; see also United States v. Larkins, 657 F.
Supp. 76, 85-86 (W.D. Ky. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988).
170. Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1241-43.
171. Akers, 785 F.2d at 820-22; United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1175-76
(D. Mass. 1986).
172. Conant v. United States, 786 F.2d 1008, 1010 (11th Cir. 1986).
173. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 647 (5th Cir. 1983) (sanctioning clearing of
wooded swamplands with marsh buggies and helicopters).
174. United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 85 n.22 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (burden of proving an
exemption to a regulatory scheme on applicant, especially given the remedial nature of the Clean Water
Act), aff'd, 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988).
175. Liebesman, supra note 168, at 17.
176. See 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.12 at 189 (noting that only a "random element," the
risk of federal enforcement, "can rise up to repudiate these institutionalized private judgments").
177. See Thompson, supra note 66, at 284-86.
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ments to the Clean Water Act also exempted from section 404 permit
requirements federal construction projects that it had specifically authorized.'
Section 404(r) thus far has received little attention. Few
projects have been exempted, and none has been judicially challenged.' 79 However, the legislative history of section 404(r) indicates
that, like the exemptions for minor activities, Congress intended only a
narrow category of activities to qualify for this exemption. First, it
applies only to projects entirely planned, financed, and constructed by
a federal agency.'
Second, the sponsoring agency must submit an
EIS to Congress analyzing the project's ability to comply with the
404(b)(1) guidelines. t ' Third, absent an EIS adequately addressing
the 404(b)(1) guidelines, federal projects remain subject to section 404
permit requirements."8 2 Finally, absent an express waiver from Con178. Section 404(r) provides:
The discharge of dredged or fill material as part of the construction of a Federal project
specifically authorized by Congress... is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this section, or a State program approved under this section . . . (except for
effluent standards or prohibitions under § 307 [33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982)]), if information on
the effects of such discharge, including consideration of the guidelines developed under
subsection (b)(1) of this section, is included in an environmental impact statement for such
project pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and such environmental impact statement has been submitted to Congress before the actual discharge of dredged
or fill material in connection with the construction of such project and prior to either authorization of such project or an appropriation of funds for such construction.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(r) (1982).
179. Passing reference is made to § 404(r) in Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41, 51
n.92 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (exemption applies only to discharges integral to designated federal projects); and
South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 128 (D.S.C. 1978) (§ 404(r) does
not exempt federal projects from § 402 permit requirements).
180. Senator Stafford remarked in floor debate:
Projects, even though fully financed by the Federal Government, which are authorized
under continuing authorities or lump sum appropriation shall be subject to 404 permits
notwithstanding the issuance by the responsible Federal agency of a proprammatic [sic] or
individual NEPA review document ....
For the purposes of this act, Federal projects are
those which are entirely planned, financed, and constructed by a Federal agency in every
respect.
123 CONG. REC. 39,193 (1977). Accord 123 CONG. REC. 38,995 (1977) (statement of Rep. Stark); 123
CONG. RIc. 38,997 (1977) (statement of Rep. Harsha); 123 CONG. REC. 39,209 (1977) (statement of
Sen. Baker).
181. Senator Muskie, in describing the conference report, stated in floor debate:
The Congress must have adequate siting, engineering, and environmental information and
analysis on each proposed Federal project, as well as on modifications recommended by
reviewing agencies, in order to review the available alternatives to and potential adverse
impacts of the proposed discharges. The Administrator [of EPA] will be expected to see
that the section 404(b)(1) guidelines are sufficiently explicit to focus attention on those
aspects of Federal project dredge and fill material discharges [in the construction of the new
projects] that could result in environmental degradation. And the Administrator must assist other agencies by carefully reviewing draft . . . [ElSs] to assure that the guidelines are
being interpreted and implemented properly.
123 CONG. REC. 39,188 (1977).
182. As Senator Muskie explained:
The depth and quality of discussion of the effects of discharges, including consideration of
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gress, federal projects must comply with all state substantive and pro83
cedural requirements.'
Unless a Corps project meets the criteria for exemption under

section 404(r), sections 313 and 404(t) of the Clean Water Act subject
the Corps, along with other federal agencies, to the requirements of

section 404.184 The Corps acknowledges this requirement in its regulations, 8 ' although in practice EPA and the Corps have disagreed
over whether the 404(r) criteria have been satisfied.' 8 6 But while the
the (b)(1) guidelines, are crucial to the operation of new subsection (r). The filing of an
impact statement adequately exploring these issues isa condition precedent to the operation
of subsection (r). Until and unless adequate impact statements, or amendments to statements, are circulated and filed in accordance with [NEPA] and the (b)(1) guidelines, the
permit requirements of section 404 ...will remain in full force and effect as to any given
project in question. The process of review of environmental impact statements by other
agencies should provide the same degree of coordination now provided in the interagency
review of permit applications.
123 CONG. REC. 39,188 (1977) (emphasis added). Speaking in support of the conference committee
report, Representative Roberts noted: "Thus Congress is to have the benefit of all the necessary information when it makes a decision. It is emphasized that the failure of a project to meet these requirements will result in the project having to obtain a section 404 permit." 123 CONG. REc, 38,970 (1977).
The courts have split on whether private parties have standing to challenge the adequacy of ElSs for
legislative proposals. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Department of Interior, 439 F.
Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1977); Wingfield v. Office of Management & Budget, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,362 (D.D.C. 1977) (no standing); Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Callaway, 431 F. Supp. 722
(D.D.C. 1977) (standing); see also D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIGATION § 4:21 (1984). In
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979), the Supreme Court ruled that agencies need not complete
an EIS on appropriation requests. However, Congress has specifically mandated that an agency seeking
a § 404(r) exemption must accompany either authorization or appropriation requests with an EIS applying the 404(b)(1) guidelines. See 33 § 1344(r), quoted supra note 178. While an agency would be
free under Andrus to not file an EIS with an appropriation request for a project within U.S. waters, it
would forego its opportunity to seek a § 404(r) exemption and would have to secure a permit.
183. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(t) (nothing in § 404 precludes or denies state substantive and procedural
controls over all discharges of dredged or fill material, including federal activities), 1370 (preserving
strict state standards). See Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 936-37 (9th Cir.
1988) (Navy must comply with the Washington Shoreline Management Act).
184. On § 404(o, see supra note 183. Section 313 provides that:
Each ...instrumentality . . . of the Federal government ... engaged in any activity...
which may result in the discharge or runoff of pollutants ...shall be subject to and comply
with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements ... respecting the control and
abatement of water pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity ....
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982).
185. 33 C.F.R. § 209.145(b)(1) (1988). These regulations were prompted by Save Our Sound
Fisheries Association v. Callaway, 387 F. Supp. 292, 306 (D.R.I. 1974) ("Congressional intent that the
permit issuance procedures apply to Corps projects is... clear from Section 301(a) of the FWPCA.").
186. For example, EPA concluded that the Corps' Big River reservoir project in Rhode Island
failed to satisfy § 404(r) because (I) the Corps failed to submit a 1981 EIS on the project to Congress;
(2) the 1981 EIS was deficient in its analysis of need, alternatives, and mitigation and failed to analyze
the project in terms of the current 404(b) guidelines; and (3) the federal government would construct
less than half of the project (most of which would be reimbursed by the state), disqualifying it as a
"federal" project under § 404(r). Letter from Michael Deland, EPA Regional Administrator, to Daniel
Wilson, Corps New England Division Engineer (Dec. 7,1988) (also asserting that the Big River project
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Corps must go through the same notice and comment process as other
permit applicants, it need not issue itself a permit; instead, it87 issues a
"statement of findings" supporting the proposed discharge.1
C General Permits
A key part of the 1977 Amendments' attempt to reduce the perceived burdens of 404 regulation was section 404(e), authorizing the
Corps to issue "general permits" on a state, regional, or nationwide
basis, thereby exempting certain categories of activities from the individual permit requirement. 8 8 Only activities "similar in nature" and
having minimal individual or cumulative adverse effects may be authorized by general permits. 8 9 General permits must comply with the
404(b)(1) guidelines and contain management standards. 190 They are
limited to five years duration and may be modified or revoked at any
time. '9'
The Corps has issued twenty-six nationwide permits, 192 covering
discharges associated with such activities as fish harvesting, bank stabilization, minor road crossing fills, and bridge building. 9 3 Nationwide permittees must satisfy a number of conditions that make a
variety of activities ineligible for authorization under nationwide permits, including discharges (1) in the proximity of public water supply
intakes, (2) in areas of concentrated shellfish production, (3) that jeopardize endangered or threatened species or modify their critical
habitat, (4) that significantly disrupt the movement of indigenous
aquatic species, (5) that contain toxic pollutants, (6) in designated or
proposed national wild and scenic rivers, or (7) that impair reserved
tribal rights. ' In addition, in some states individual water quality
certification and coastal zone management consistency must be
secured. "I
failed to comply with a condition of its congressional authorization by failing to reevaluate fish and
wildlife mitigation).

187. 33 C.F.R. §§ 335.2, 337.6 (1988). See Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198, 1204 n.20 (8th
Cir. 1976) (Corps regulations provide "a procedure functionally equivalent to permit issuance for its
own dredging projects").
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (1982).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 1344(e)(2).
192. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.5 (1988).
193. Id. §§ 330.5(a)(4), (13)-(15).
194. Id. §§ 330.5(b)(l)-(5), (7), (10).
195. Id. §§ 330.9(a), 330.10; see United States v. Marathon Devel. Corp., 867 F.2d 96 (IstCir.
1989) (affirming a criminal conviction on the ground that a nationwide permit did not authorize the
discharge because Massachusetts had denied water quality certification); see also Hill & Treacy, Wet.
lands Protection Through the § 401 Certification Program in West Virginia, NAT'L WETtANDS NEwst..,
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Also authorized by nationwide permit are discharges occurring in
wetlands smaller than ten acres located above the "headwaters" of
nontidal waters (where streamflow is less than five cubic feet per second) or in "isolated waters" not part of a surface tributary system.1 96
These permits exempt from individual permit coverage some seventeen
million acres of wetlands in the contiguous states, thereby authorizing
about 40,000 discharges annually. 9 7 Not surprisingly, they have
proved to be quite controversial. When first proposed, EPA declared
that "issuance of nationwide permits for classes of waters, in addition
to categories of activities, has no basis and is inconsistent with Congressional intent,"' 9 8 noting that section 404(e)(1) limits the issuance
of general permits, nationwide or otherwise, to activities "similar in
nature."' 99 The National Wildlife Federation settlement did reduce
the scope of these authorizations by reinstating the ten-acre limit and
also requiring predischarge notification for discharges causing the
"loss of or substantial adverse modification" to wetlands between one
and ten acres. 2" Still, the statute nowhere authorizes exempting entire classes of waters from the requirement of obtaining individual
permits.2 ° '
Corps District Engineers have the authority to modify, condition,
and revoke general permits to ensure greater environmental protection.2 °2 The conditions limiting the applicability of nationwide permits have eliminated some particularly damaging activities from that
program.2° 3 And the courts have generally interpreted the scope of
the nationwide permits narrowly, at least where the government is
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 6-7; Ransel, State Water Quality Certification and Wetlands Protection, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1988, at 6-8.
196. 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)(26) (authorizing discharges into waters above the "headwaters" and
"isolated" waters except those causing "the loss or substantial adverse modification" of 10 acres or

more). See also id. § 330.2(b) (definition of "headwaters"),
197. See Nagle, supra note 98, at 237; Tomasello, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Risks of
Regulatory Reform, 58 FLA. BAR J. 232 (1984).
198. Letter from William N. Hedeman, Jr., to Major General E.R. Heiberg III (Dec. 31, 1980),
quoted in Nagle, supra note 98, at 247.
199. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (1982); see Blumm. supra note 10, at 483-84. The Corps appears to
have amended the statute by authorizing general permits for activities "substantially similar" in nature.
33 C.F.R. § 322.2(f)(1).
200. See supra text accompanying note 102.
201. See Note, Environmental Law-Nationwide Permits for Categories of Waters Issued by the
Corps of Engineers Under FWPCA Section 404: A Legitimate Administrative Interpretation Ratified by
Congress?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 904, 912 (1983).
202. 33 C.F.R. §§ 325.4, 325.7 (1988).
203. See supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text. See also Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985) (dam not eligible for nationwide permit because developer could
not prove that activities would not have distant downstream effects on endangered whooping crane
habitat).
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pursuing an enforcement action.2 " Nevertheless, as in the case of the
404(f) exemptions, 20 5 the general permit program allows private decision makers to determine whether their activities are covered by a general permit. In effect, the general permit and minor activities
exemption programs reverse the burden of securing approval otherwise imposed on a permit applicant, and place it on the Corps and
EPA to take action as 404 enforcement agencies.
D. State Programs
In addition to the statutory exemptions and the Corps general
permits, state permit programs were part of the 1977 congressional
compromise that maintained broad geographic jurisdiction but sought
to limit the accompanying regulatory burden. In waters other than
traditionally navigable waters, states may displace Corps permitting if
EPA ascertains that the state program satisfies a detailed set of statutory criteria.2" 6 EPA promulgated state program approval regulations
in 1979, which only one state, Michigan, has managed to satisfy.20 7
The principal reasons for this poor state record are a lack of federal
grant money to help administer state programs and the fact that the
Corps' general permit program exempts numerous activities from individual permits. The latter reason produces less interest among the regulated to eliminate the federal presence than there is in the case of the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, authorized by section 402 of the Clean Water Act,20 8 where nearly forty state programs
have received EPA approval. 20 9 However, the Task Force on Regulatory Relief thought the lack of state programs was due to the stringency of the EPA approval regulations and directed EPA to revise
them to make it easier for states to obtain approval.2 t0 Whether the
204. See United States v. Wichard, 718 F.2d 1094 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lambert, 589
F. Supp. 366, 371 (M.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Winters, No. EC 82-155-LS (W.D. Miss. June 4,

1984) (all ruling discharges ineligible for authorization under the "headwaters" nationwide permit).
205. See supra notes 158-176 and accompanying text.
206. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)-(h) (1982). For an overview of the statutory and regulatory requirements of state 404 programs, see Blumm, supra note 40, at 454-60.
207. 44 Fed. Reg. 32,918 (1979) (consolidated regulations for state programs under §§ 402 and
404 of the Act). On Michigan's program, see 40 C.F.R. § 233.42; see also Wolverton, State Court of
Appeals Upholds Michigan Wetland Regulations, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 14-15
(discussing Blue Water Isles Co. v. Department of Natural Resources, 171 Mich. App. 526, 431
N.W.2d 53 (1988)); Harrington, Michigan 404 Program Assumption, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.Feb. 1985, at 10-12.
208. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
209. As of March 1989, 39 states had received federal approval to issue NPDES permits. See [1
State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 611:0111 (Mar. 17, 1989).
210. See Barton 1, supra note 28, at 245. The National Wetlands Policy Forum also sought to
increase the state § 404 role, both through changes in EPA regulations and in the statute. See FORUM
REPORT, supra note 12, at 5-6, 21-23.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972405

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

new rules will induce a state rush to implement section 404 is
unclear. 2 "
Although not authorized to approve state 404 programs, the
Corps has attempted to employ its general permit program to effectively substitute state regulatory programs for 404 regulation, an effort
that seems to have subsided somewhat in the wake of the National
Wildlife Federationsettlement.2 1 2 Statewide programmatic permits effectively undermine both EPA's role in approving state 404 programs
and the statutory standards Congress established for program approval in sections 404(g) and (h).2" 3 Nevertheless, Corps regulations
still authorize such permits and fail to reflect the statutory requirement that the authorized activities be similar in nature.2 14

III.

PERMIT CRITERIA

This section reviews the process by which 404 permits are issued
and the standards governing their issuance. Because the decision
whether to issue a 404 permit is often the result of the opinion of an
agency other than the Corps, the substance of the regulatory program
is tied closely to the procedures by which permits are reviewed. Thus,
the consultation and review procedures required by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act 2t1 warrant special attention. In addition, this
section also examines substantive permit criteria, such as the duty to
consider alternatives and the findings required by the 404(b) guidelines. Also considered is the administrative controversy over the force
and effect of the guidelines, as well as recent judicial interpretation.
Finally, the section assesses some 404 program peculiarities, such as
"after the fact" permits and interagency agreements.
211. Revised state program approval rules were promulgated on June 6, 1988. 53 Fed. Reg.
20,764 (1988). Their principal inducement for states is a relaxed federal oversight policy whereby EPA
will waive federal oversight of categories of discharges. See id. at 20,784 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 233.51). EPA explained that it intends to employ this waiver to focus only on proposed discharges
with potentially serious adverse environmental effects, noting that in Michigan (the only state with an
approved 404 program) only one percent of permit applications received federal review in 1985 and
only about 1.5 percent in 1986. Id. at 20,772. For an overview of the regulations, see Williams, EPA
Revises State Wetlands Regulations, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 13-14.
212. See Barton I, supra note 28, at 245 (reporting that the count in the National Wildlife Federation suit, supra note 102 and accompanying text, concerning statewide general permits was dismissed
because the Corps had made "little headway in issuing such permits, and [because] the Corps claims
'most' of those apply only to certain actions and only in certain waters").
213. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(g), (h) (1982). In particular, such permits may not ensure that authorized
activities comply with the 404(b) guidelines.
214. 33 C.F.R. §§ 322.2(f), 323.3(h), 325.5(c)(3) (1988). See supra notes 198-199.
215. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1982).
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A. Permit Procedures In General
1. Individual Permits
Individual 404 permits are issued both in advance of and after a
discharge occurs. 2' 6 General permits are issued on a regional basis by
Corps districts under procedures similar to individual permits. 2t 7 Nationwide permits, of course, employ a different path: notice and comment rulemaking. 2 t8 Permit applicants must submit their proposals to
the local Corps District Engineer,21 9 who notifies interested parties
and the general public,220 decides whether to hold a hearing,2 2 t and
analyzes the environmental effects of the proposal in an environmental
assessment (EA).2 22 If the action may have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment, an environmental impact statement (EIS) is prepared.22 3 Based on the analysis of the EA and/or
EIS, the District Engineer decides whether and under what conditions
to grant the permit.22 4 Where either EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, or the National Marine Fisheries Service objects to the proposal,
additional administrative procedures are required.2 25 Despite these
procedures, an overwhelming percentage of 404 applications receive
permits. For example, in Louisiana during 1980-86, the Corps issued
permits to 99.36 percent of permit applicants.2 2 6
2. "After-the-Fact" Permits
Applicants may also apply for "after the fact," retroactive permits to cure discharges made illegally without a permit. Upon discovering an illegal discharge, the District Engineer must conduct an
216. 33 C.F.R. §§ 325.8, 326.3(e).
217. Id. §§ 325.2(e)(2), 325.5(c)(1).
218. Id. §§ 325.5(c)(2), 330.5(b)-(c).
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.

§ 325.1(b).
§ 325.3(d).
§§ 325.2(a)(5), 327.4(a).
§§ 230.7(e), 230.9, 230 App. A.

223. Id. §§ 230.6, 230 App. B. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). However, Corps decisions to prepare EISs on permit applications are relatively rare. For example, in 1986 the Corps prepared only 20 E1Ss on some 10,000 proposals. See
Baldwin, CEQ Supports the Corps on NEPA, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1987, at 2.
224. 33 C.F.R. § 325.4 (permit conditions must be "directly related to the impacts of the proposal, appropriate to the scope and degree of those impacts, and reasonably enforceable"). See also id.
§ 325.4(a)(3) (authorizing both on-site and off-site mitigation conditions for "significant losses which
are specifically identifiable, reasonably likely to occur, and of importance to the human or aquatic
environment"); § 320.4(r) (Corps general mitigation policy).
225. See infra notes 258-265 and accompanying text.
226. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REv. 358,
361 n.16 (1988).
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investigation 227 and, if the activity is still in progress, issue a cease and
desist order. 22 ' After consulting with other federal agencies, the District Engineer may either recommend legal action against the discharger or request that the discharger apply for an "after the fact"
permit.

22 9

After-the-fact permits pose a number of troublesome issues.
These post-hoc ratifications of illegal discharges conflict with the concept of a regulatory program grounded on assessing the impacts of
activities before they take place. Their widespread use is perhaps attributable to the Corps' regulations, which actually seem to instruct
District Engineers to presume after-the-fact permits are the appropriate response to unauthorized discharges, not formal enforcement procedures.2 s° Questions persist about whether such authorizations,
termed a "policy of mass amnesty" by one commentator, could possibly satisfy the permit criteria contained in the 404(b)(1) guidelines,2 3 2 and whether they serve to insulate the discharge from citizen
suit enforcement.2 33
These questions have received little judicial attention.2 34 The
227. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(b) (1988).
228. Id. § 326.3(c)(1).
229. Id. § 326.3(e). A recently signed memorandum of agreement between the Corps and EPA
on section 404 enforcement stipulates that the Corps will accept no after-the-fact permit application
unless "'all administrative, legal and/or corrective action has been completed, or a decision has been
made that no enforcement action is to be taken." MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
DEPARTMENT Of THE ARMY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CONCERNING FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT FOR THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT § nl(G) (Jan.
19, 1989); see also infra note 388 and accompanying text.
230. See 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e):
Following the completion of any required initial corrective measures, the district engineer
will accept an after-the-fact permit application unless he determines ...(i) ... restoration
... has been completed .... (ii). ..legal action is appropriate ....(iii) a Federal, state, or
local authorization ...has already been denied, [and/or) (iv) enforcement litigation ...has
been initiated ....
(Emphasis added.) The regulations note that civil penalties are appropriate in the case of violations that
are "willful, repeated, flagrant, or of substantial impact." Id. § 326.5(a).
231. 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.13, at 217.
232. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e)(2) (requiring after-the-fact permits to comply with the 404(b)(1)
guidelines).
233. Although a permit puts a discharger in compliance with the Clean Water Act from the date
of its issuance, see § 404(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(p), the Supreme Court recently ruled that citizen suits
have to be based on a "good-faith allegation" of intermittent or ongoing violations. Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 378 (1987). Since the good-faith allegation is measured from the
time of the notice of intent to file a suit, a subsequently issued, after-the-fact permit would not defeat
the suit, although it might heavily influence the penalty imposed.
234. See, e.g., Quinones Lopez v. Coco Lagoon Devel. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 188, 191-92 (D.P.R.
1983) (sustaining the issuance of an after-the-fact permit issued without public hearings or a state
coastal zone certificate); United States v. Alleyne, 454 F. Supp. 1164, 1172-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding
that a defendant in an illegal discharge suit was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issues of
whether he should be issued an after-the-fact permit, despite the fact that he never applied for such a
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leading case is a First Circuit opinion that briefly addressed when the
Corps may refuse to accept an after-the-fact permit application, and
sustained a Corps refusal to consider such an application until the discharger complied with a cease and desist order requiring restoration of
the area to its wetland condition.23 5 The court ruled that the Corps
before
regulations "clearly require that remedial work be completed
236
application.)
permit
after-the-fact
an
accept
will
the Corps
B. The Public Interest Review
Since the late 1960s, all Corps regulatory programs have been
governed by the Corps' public interest review.237 This broad-based
balancing of a host of economic and environmental factors authorizes
Corps District Engineers to weigh a panoply of values on a case-bycase basis. While it has been described as a "parody of standardless
administrative choice, '2 38 the public interest review is not entirely
without standards that curb administrative discretion. Some of these
limits are imposed by Corps regulations, others by interagency consultation requirements. This section examines each in turn.
1. The Corps' Balancing Act
The heart of the public interest review is the Corps' commitment
to perform a "careful weighing" of the "benefits which may reasonably be expected to accrue" from a proposed discharge against its
permit, and whether the Corps had improperly selected the defendant for enforcement based on race);
cf. United States v. Boccanfuso, 695 F. Supp. 693, 700 (D. Conn. 1988) (Corps should process an after
the fact permit rather than issue a restoration order based on a five-year old environmental assessment).
235. United States v. Cumberland Farms, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987).
236. Id. at 1163. The court continued:
When [the defendant] refused to comply with the Corps remedial order, and instead continued further destruction of the wetland, the Corps was within its rights, and indeed was left
with no other recourse, but to seek judicial enforcement of the remedial restoration order,
rather than to process administratively an after-the-fact permit.
Id. The court's "no other recourse" language is an overstatement, because the decision whether to
require remedial measures before considering an after-the-fact permit is discretionary with the Corps.
See 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(d)(1) ("If the district engineer determines ...that initial corrective measures are
required, he should issue an appropriate order."). Cumberland Farms stands for the proposition that
the Corps has discretion to refuse to consider an after-the-fact permit until corrective measures have
been taken, but not that it must do so.
237. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. In addition to issuing 404 permits, the Corps
issues permits for dams and dikes in navigable waters under section 9 of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
Act (33 U.S.C. § 401), see 33 C.F.R. § 321.1; for "structures or work in or affecting navigable waters"
under § 10 of the 1899 Act (33 U.S.C. § 403), see 33 C.F.R. § 322; and for "the transportation of
dredged material" for the purpose of ocean disposal under section 103 of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (33 U.S.C. § 1413), see 33 C.F.R. § 324.
238. 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.12, at 205. Accord Mall Properties v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp.
561, 566-67 (D. Mass. 1987).
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"reasonably foreseeable detriments., 239 Assuming that district engineers possess the wisdom of Solomon, Corps regulations promise that
this balancing will consider public and private need for the project,
alternative locations and means of accomplishing the objective where
there exist unresolved resource use conflicts, effects on public and private uses, cumulative impacts, and some twenty other factors ranging
from "environmental concerns" to "energy needs" to "considerations
of property ownership. ' ' 2 ' All of these factors are evaluated in light
of "the national concern for both protection and utilization of impor-

tant resources." The process is designed to generate permit decisions
that serve "the needs and welfare of the people, '241 an archetypical
New Deal decision-making goal that seems anachronistic in an era
that long ago rejected the New Deal paradigm of dispassionate agency
expertise.24 2
While judicial review of agency decision making under this apparently open-ended charter is predictably of the "soft glance" variety,243 one court found the Corps' public interest balancing to weigh

environmental factors too heavily. 24 Some limits are evident in the
Corps' regulations, which require permit denial for discharges into
"important" wetlands unless the benefits to the discharge outweigh the

damage to the wetlands resource, after considering the criteria contained in the section 404(b)(1) guidelines.2 45 Overcoming this pre239. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a); see Steinberg & Dowd, Economic Consideralions in the Section 404
Wetland Permit Process, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCEs L. 277, 282-87 (1988).
240. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a):
All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered including the cumulative effects thereof: among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards,
floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of
the people.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticismsand Refinements,
68 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1983).
243. See I W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 3.2; Environmental Coalition v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984,
986 (11 th Cir. 1987) (deferential judicial review especially appropriate, given the complexity of the
Clean Water Act and Corps decision-making that involves balancing).
244. Mall Properties v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561, 566, 574-75 (D. Mass. 1987) (Corps cannot
reject a permit for mall exclusively on economic competition grounds where the economic concerns
were unrelated to the project's environmental impacts, relying on Metropolitan Edison v. PANE, 460
U.S. 766 (1983)).
245. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(4) (1988). Wetlands "perform[ing] functions important to the public
interest" include those "serv[ing] significant natural biological functions," such as "habitat and nesting,
spawning, rearing and resting sites" for wildlife; those "set aside for study"; those performing drainage,
flood control, recharge and water purification functions; and those "unique in nature or scarce" in the
local area. Id. § 320.4(b)(2).
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sumption of no discharge requires a reasoned administrative record2 46
and probably absence of dissent from other resource agencies.2 47
The effect of the Corps' presumption against wetland fills on its
public interest balancing is not entirely clear, but denial of other required federal, state, and local authorizations requires 404 permit denial.24 On the other hand, other permit approvals tilt the public
interest balancing toward permit issuance. 249 And although public interest balancing requires a consideration of alternatives,2 5 ° the Corps,
with the blessing of the Council on Environmental Quality (but over
EPA's objection), recently narrowed its evaluation of alternatives to
granting or denying the permit, and suggested that normally only alternatives available to the applicant require consideration. 21 This will
246. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1031 (2d Cir. 1983)
(enjoining the Corps' initial decision on the Westway Highway in Manhattan).
247. See infra notes 267-270 and accompanying text.
248. 33 C.F.R. § 320.40). However, it is Corps policy to attempt to eliminate duplicative permit
processing by issuing general programmatic permits, or, where not practical, to develop joint permit
processing procedures. Id. § 320.40)(5). Denial of state water quality or coastal zone management
consistency certification results in 404 permit denial unless the Secretary of Commerce overrides the
state coastal zone denial. Id. § 320.4(d), (h). See United States v. Marathon Devel. Corp., 867 F.2d 96
(1st Cir. 1989), discussed supra note 195. On the potential role of state water qualilty certification in
the 404 program, see Ransel & Meyers, State Water Quality Certification and Wetland Protection: A
Call to Awaken the Sleeping Giant, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 339 (1988).
249. 33 C.F.R. § 320.46)(2) (absent "overriding national factors of the public interest," 404 permits generally issued after state and local approval). Federal authorizations are entitled to "substantial
consideration." Id. § 320.40)(4).
250. The requirement to consider alternatives whenever there are unresolved resource conflicts
springs from § 102(2)(E) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1982).
251. 53 Fed. Reg. 3127 (1988) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 325 App. B at par. 9(5) ("Our intent
in this paragraph is to have reasonable alternatives considered in the EIS which could be implemented
by the applicant. Where necessary for an informed decision on the public interest, alternatives beyond
those that could be implemented by the applicant should also be considered.")).
Prior to 1988, Corps regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 230 App. B at par. 8(a), required the Corps to
consider "whether or not the entire project subject to the permit requirement could have significant
effects on the environment." However, in 1984 the Corps proposed changes that would (1) narrow its
environmental analysis to those effects produced by granting the permit; (2) limit its consideration of
the need for the permit, not need for the project; and (3) similarly curb its evaluation of alternatives. 49
Fed. Reg, 1387-99 (1984). This proposal was prompted by two circuit court decisions, Winnebago
Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.) (Corps need only assess the impacts of a 1.25-mile transmission
line crossing a navigable river and not the impacts of the entire 67-mile line), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900
(1980); and Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 610 F.2d 322, 326-27 (5th
Cir.) (Corps issuance to a chemical manufacturing plant of a pipeline construction permit was not a
"major federal action," in part because EPA had already issued an NPDES permit), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 836 (1980). EPA objected to the proposed changes, citing its need for information on project
impacts and reasonable alternatives to fulfill its duties under § 309 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7609 (1982) (giving EPA authority to review and comment on all unsatisfactory federal actions to the
Council on Environmental Quality). EPA therefore referred the matter to CEQ (see 40 C.F.R. § 1504),
which sided with the Corps, although it did rule that the Corps must analyze alternatives to nonwater
dependent uses, as required by the 404(b) guidelines discussed infra notes 277-280 and accompanying
text. See generally Baldwin, CEQ Supports Corps on NEPA, NAT'I. WETLANDS NEWSI.., July-Aug.
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surely result in fewer Corps EISs, as it constricts the "small federal
handle" rule by which a federal permit requirement effectively federalized the entire project for NEPA purposes. 2" Limiting the scope of
alternatives may also skew the public interest balancing toward applicant visions of the purpose and need for projects.25 3
2. Interagency Consultation
Consultation requirements have been a hallmark of Corps regulation since 1967254 but proved to be quite controversial in the 1980s. 255
They are a critical aspect of the 404 program's ability to protect wetlands because the agencies with the most wetlands expertise-the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and state fish and wildlife agencies-are not authorized
permit agencies. Moreover, the public interest review frequently involves the Corps in socioeconomic decisions far beyond its traditional
navigation expertise.25 6 As a result, the Corps must often rely on the
participation of state and federal fish and wildlife agencies and EPA
for assistance in assessing the costs and benefits of proposed activities.
Corps regulations acknowledge this dependence by guaranteeing "full
consideration" to the views of the federal and state fish and wildlife
agencies. 25 7 However, in the early 1980s the perceived need to expedite permit processing undermined this guarantee and prompted a
number of interagency battles between the Corps and the reviewing
agencies.
Expediting permit processing was a concern of the 1977 Amend1987, at 2-3; Baldwin, EPA Refers Proposed Corps NEPA Procedures. to CEQ, NATL WETLANDS
NEWSL., May-June 1985, at 3-5.
252. See D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 8.16 (1984).
253. Applicant economic objectives have limited the scope of alternatives. See South La. Envtl.
Council v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. 1980); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp.
985, 1000 (D.D.C. 1983). See also Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section
404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Statutes, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 773 (1989).
254. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 97, 103-104 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Mall Properties v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1987).
257. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(c) (1988). Between 1973 and 1984, the Corps attached "great weight- to
9
these views. See 33 C.F.R. § 20 .120(g)(4) (1974); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(c) (1977). "Great weight" was
transformed into "full consideration" in the 1984 regulations implementing the National Wildlife Federation settlement. 49 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 39,482 (1984). The Corps explained the change was necessary
to reflect more accurately the language of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and NEPA. 49 Fed.
Reg. at 39,478 (1984). While stating in the preamble to its 1986 regulations that "[ill is not our intenition to reduce or discount the value or expertise of fish and wildlife agency comments or those of any
other experts in any field," 51 Fed. Reg. at 4,1,206-07 (1986), the Corps declared in the regulations
themselves that whether to accord any permit issuance factor "great weight" will be discretionary. 33
C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(3) (1987). Acknowledging the expertise of the fish and wildlife agencies may not be
the same as according their comments "great weight" in determining all permit decisions. Notice that
federal permit approvals are accorded "substantial consideration." See supra note 249.
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ments, which responded to allegations that interagency consultation
produced lengthy permit delays by requiring section 404(q) interagency agreements to speed permit processing. 25 8 Memoranda of
agreement were signed between the Corps and reviewing agencies in
1980,259 but these were revised in 1982 after the President's Task
Force on Regulatory Reform recommended a substantial reduction in°
26
reviewing agencies' opportunities to invoke administrative appeals.
Reviewing agency dissatisfaction with these limits, along with congressional pressure, forced revisions in 1985.261 But while the new agreements make administrative appeals more possible,26 2 discretion to
grant or deny an appeal remains with the Assistant Secretary of the
Army, and only one level of appeal is possible. 26 3 Thus, if EPA and
the Corps disagree over how to apply the 404(b) guidelines to a particular discharge and the Assistant Army Secretary denies EPA's request
for review, EPA must institute permit veto procedures under section
404(c) or accept the Corps' interpretation of the guidelines. 26 1 Fur-

ther, the only recourse available to a federal or state fish and wildlife
agency is to convince EPA to invoke section 404(c). 265
While the Corps must give "full consideration" to the views of
federal and state fish and wildlife agencies, ultimately the Corps need
not agree with their conclusions. 26 6 Nevertheless, the written records
produced as a result of the consultation process are critical not only to
258. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(q) (Supp. V 1987); see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
259. For a review of some of the difficulties the agencies encountered in reaching the 1980 agreements, see Blumm, supra note 40, at 443-45.
260. See supra notes 93, 97 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Letter from G. Ray Arnett, Ass't Secretary of Interior for Fish & Wildlife, to
Robert K. Dawson, Acting Ass't Secretary of the Army for Civil Works (Nov. 7, 1984), discussed in
Barton 1, supra note 28, at 242. On the congressional pressure, see supra note 103.
262. See supra text accompanying note 104.
263. See EPA and FWS Sign New § 404(q) MOAs With Army, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.Feb. 1986, at 2-4.
264. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (Nov. 12, 1985) [hereinafter 1985 EPA-CoRPS MEMORANDUM
OF AGREEMENT]. To enable EPA to invoke its veto authority under section 404(c) (discussed infra
part IV.A), the agreement requires the Corps to supply EPA with a written record at least 10 days prior
to the discharge. 1985 EPA-CORPS MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT § 8, at 5.
265. The agreement between the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Corps does require the Corps
to review permit applications for compliance with the Council on Environmental Quality's mitigation
regulation (40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1988)), see EPA and FWS Sign New § 404(q) MOAs With Army, supra
note 263, at 4, but it does not clarify whether the regulation implies a "sequencing" of mitigation
techniques (e.g., to prefer avoiding impacts altogether over minimizing impacts by limiting the action,
and to prefer minimizing impacts over restoration efforts, operating conditions, and supplying substitute resources).
266. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs (Westway 11), 772 F.2d 1043, 1054 (2d
Cir. 1985) (only "serious consideration" warranted); River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 764
F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1985); Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Marsh, 736 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.
1984).
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assist EPA in ascertaining whether a project complies with the 404(b)
guidelines or merits a 404(c) veto, but also in facilitating judicial review. Courts increasingly employ these records to determine whether
the Corps has complied with section 404 as well as other statutory
requirements.2 6 For example, there is a welter of cases finding violations of the National Environmental Policy Act 268 where administrative records reflect reviewing agency opposition.2 69 Thus, through full
use of the consultation process, fish and wildlife agencies can help
achieve NEPA's neglected goal of elevating the position of agencies
with environmental expertise.2 7 °
C. The 404(b) Guidelines
First published following the Callaway decision in 1975,27 and
then subjected to vigorous collateral attack by the Corps under the
guise of regulatory reform,272 the 404(b) guidelines are now the chief

environmental criteria governing the 404 program. 273 The Corps acquiesced to their binding nature as part of the National Wildlife Federation settlement and promulgated regulations to that effect.2 74 Section
404 permits may not be issued for discharges that do not comply with
267. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs (Westway 1), 701 F.2d 101!,
1021-24, 1030-31, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing, respectively, resource agency opposition, possible
NEPA violation, and possible 404 violation); Westway 11,.772 F.2d at 1053 (NEPA and 404 violations,
despite fulfilling consultation requirements); National Wildlife Fed'n v. FERC, 801 F.2d 1505 (9th Cir.
1986) (violations of Federal Power Act and Northwest Power Act); Washington State Dep't of Fisheries v. FERC, 801 F.2d 1516 (9th Cir. 1986) (violations of the Federal Power Act and Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act; Coordination Act imposes a duty to consider and respond); Confederated Tribes v.
FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984) (violations of Federal Power Act, NEPA, the Northwest Power
Act, and the Coordination Act; Coordination Act imposes an affirmative duty on action agency to
consult with fish and wildlife agencies-mere notice insufficient), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985).
For an analysis of the latter case, see Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming the Federal Role
in Hydropower Licensing, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. I, 34-46 (1986).
268. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982).
269. E.g., Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986)
(EIS inadequate; violations of state water quality standards), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d
754 (9th Cir. 1985) (environmental assessment inadequate); The Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382
(9th Cir. 1985) (environmental assessment inadequate); Forelaws on Bd. v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1984) (EIS required); Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681
F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982) (EIS required).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
271. NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
273. 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1988); see Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41, 50-51 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 68 (1987).
274. Sie 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.4(aXI), 320.4(b)(4), 323.6(a), 325.2(a)(6), 325.3(c)(2) (fulfilling paragraph 18 of settlement agreement in National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,262, 20,264 (D.D.C. Feb. II, 1984)).
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the guidelines, although the Corps also may deny permits to activities
that comply with the guidelines based on its public interest review. 21'
The guidelines and the public interest review are therefore independent grounds for permit denial.
1. Basic Requirements
Unlike the Corps' public interest review, which emphasizes utilitarian balancing, the premise of the 404(b) guidelines is that no discharges will be authorized that would have an unacceptable adverse
impact on the aquatic ecosystem. 27 6 To implement this precept, the
guidelines establish a revolutionary presumption against discharges
where there are practicable alternatives having a less damaging impact
on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have
other significant environmental consequences.2 7 "Practicable alternatives" are a function of cost, as well as technical and logistical factors.2 78 Although alternatives must be capable of achieving the basic
purpose of the proposed activity, the lack of property ownership does
not necessarily determine what is practicable.2 79 Discharges into "special aquatic sites," such as wetlands, for nonwater dependent uses are
presumed to have practicable alternatives.28 ° The guidelines declare
that "[t]he guiding principle should be that degradation or destruction
275. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(4); see also 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (note). The guidelines are promulgated
"in conjunction with" the Corps, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987), a directive unique in United
States environmental law.
276. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(c) (1988) (unacceptable adverse impacts include both individual and cumulative impacts).
The guidelines also demand scrutiny of practicable alternatives to proposed discharges, a task that
requires inquiry into factors such as cost and technical feasibility. See infra text accompanying note
278. Economic considerations are thus actually implicit in section 404(b) analysis. This reality has
contributed materially to the friction between the two agencies, as it sometimes appears that EPA,
through. its application of the guidelines, is overruling the Corps' public interest balancing.
277. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a).
278. Id.; but see Friends of the Earth v. Hall, 693 F. Supp. 904, 907 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (significant additional cost of an alternative may not by itself eliminate that alternative).
279. Id. §§ 230.10(a)(l)-(2) (areas not presently owned by the applicant must be "reasonably"
obtainable). See Houck, supra note 253, at 829-840; Tripp & Herz, supra note 7, at 246-48 (both
suggesting a number of techniques to make the alternatives analysis more stringent).
280. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3):
Where the activity associated with a discharge which is proposed for a special aquatic site
. . . does not require access or proximity to or siting within the special aquatic site in
question to fulfill its basic purpose (i.e., is not 'water dependent') practicable alternatives
that do not involve special aquatic sites are presumed to be available unless clearly demonstrated otherwise.
Special aquatic sites are areas "possessing special ecological characteristics of productivity, habitat,
wildlife protection, or other important and easily disrupted ecological values ... significantly influencing or positively contributing to the general overall environmental health or vitality of the entire ecosystem of a region." Id. § 230.3(q-1). In addition to wetlands, they include sanctuaries and refuges, mud
flats, vegetated shallows, coral reefs, and riffle and pool complexes. Id. §§ 230.40 -.45.
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of special [aquatic] sites may represent an irretrievable loss of valuable
aquatic resources.2 8 ' In addition, they expressly prohibit certain types
of discharges28 2 and forbid any discharge causing or contributing to
"significant degradation of the waters of the United States. 2 8 3 Also
proscribed are all discharges unless "appropriate and practicable", mitigation measures have been taken.284
To effectuate these presumptions and limitations, the guidelines
require documented factual determinations of the potential short- and
long-term effects of proposed discharges on the aquatic environment,2 85 including cumulative effects. 28 6 Before any 404 permit may
be issued, specific findings of compliance with the guidelines must be
made,28 7 a requirement the Corps originally resisted.28 8 While ultimately acceding to the binding nature of the guidelines,28 9 the Corps
did succeed in exacting from EPA an acknowledgement that the
Corps may interpret them. 290 As a result, EPA may not use its interpretation of the guidelines to override a Corps permit decision outside
the context of a formal permit veto under section 404(c). 29 1
The 404(b) guidelines, it should be noted, do not simply govern
the issuance of individual Corps permits. They also apply to general
permits,

292

permits issued under approved state 404 programs,

293

and

federal projects exempted from 404 permit requirements by section
281. Id. § 230.1(d).
282. Id. § 230.10(b) (discharges causing or contributing to violations of state water quality standards, violating toxic effluent standards or prohibitions, jeopardizing the continued existence of endangered or threatened species or resulting in the likely destruction or adverse modification of their critical
habitat, or violating a requirement imposed to protect a marine sanctuary).
283. Id.§ 230. 10(c) (including significant adverse effects on (I) human health and welfare; (2) life
stages of aquatic life and other wildlife dependent on aquatic ecosystems; (3) aquatic ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability; and (4) recreational, aesthetic, and economic values).
284. Id. § 230. 10(d). Mitigating conditions include both alternative locations and operating conditions, including water releases from dams for fish and wildlife needs and water quality controls in
dredging operations. Id. §§ 230.70-.71.

285. Id. § 230.11. See id. §§ 230.20 -.25 (potential physical and chemical effects), 230.30 -.32
(potential biological effects), 230.40 -.45 (potential effects on special aquatic sites), 230.50 -.54 (potential
effects on water supplies, fisheries, recreation, aesthetics, and preserves); see also id. § 230.60 -.61 (evaluation and testing procedures).
286. Id. § 230.11(g).
287. Id. § 230.12.
288. See generally Liebesman, supra note 87, at 10,274-76 (explaining Corps objections to the
binding nature and detailed provisions of the guidelines, and discussing Corps efforts to have them
revised in 1983).
289. See supra text accompanying note 274.
290.

1985 EPA-CoRPS MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 264, § 5(d), at 2.

291. Cf.EPA's authority to override the Corps on jurisdictional determinations and the Corps'
promise to "fully implement" EPA guidance on jurisdictional issues under the 1989 MOA, supra notes
151-155 and accompanying text.
292. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 230.7 (1988) (expressly limiting activities authorized under general permits to those that are similar in nature and similar in their effect on the aquatic
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404(r).2 9 4 In short, they constitute, as one court noted, the yardstick
by which all significant discharges are scrutinized.2 95
2. Judicial Interpretation
The 404(b) guidelines have fared rather well in court. They have
been construed to proscribe discharges "likely to result in significant
loss of or damage to fisheries, ' 296 to require 404 permits of dams licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 29 7 and to bind
the Corps.298 The presumption against discharges for nonwaterdependent uses has received favorable judicial treatment, sanctioning
Corps permit denials 299 and even leading to a reversal of a Corps decision permitting a fill for a residential development. 3"
The chief controversy has been over whether there in fact are
practicable, less damaging alternatives available. In general, the
courts have given the Corps wide berth to interpret this requirement,
although there is an anomalous decision overturning a Corps permit
denial for an industrial park.30 ' The guidelines have hardly proved to
be a bar to all development, as some applicants have succeeded in deenvironment; also requiring a prediction of the number of discharges likely to take place in order to
assess cumulative effects).
293. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(h)(1)(A); see supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text.
294. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(r); see supra notes 177-187 and accompanying text.
295. Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41, 50-51 (D.C. Cir.) (describing section 404 as
"transmit[ting] a crisp and unwavering message: all significant discharges, whether or not exempt from
the permit requirement, must be subjected to Section 404(b)(1) scrutiny or its equivalent"), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 68 (1987).
296. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs (Westway 11), 772 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1985) (interpreting 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1(c), 231.2(e) (1988)).
297. Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 68
(1987).
298. Id. at 50; Westway 11, 772 F.2d at 1050; Shoreland Assocs. v. Marsh, 555 F. Supp. 169, 179
(D. Md. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1984); Friends of the Earth v. Hall, 693 F. Supp. 904, 94546 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (finding arbitrary Corps determinations that project will not cause "'significant
degradation" and lacks practicable alternatives, based on inadequate review under NEPA).
299. Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1180 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming permit denial for a
stream channelization project and stating that "the Clean Water Act and the applicable regulations do
not contemplate that wetlands will be destroyed simply because it is more convenient than not to do
so"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983); Shoreline, 555 F. Supp. at 169 (nonaquatic site a practicable
alternative).
300. Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982) (Corps permit for a quarter-acre fill for
two houses and a tennis court remanded because a letter from a realtor claiming that the site was the
only one suitable for the project was not a sufficient basis to conclude there were no available
alternatives).
301. 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983). 1902 Atlantic reversed a
Corps permit denial on the ground that the Corps overemphasized environmental concerns and failed
to consider the benefits of increased jobs and tax revenue in its general balancing. The case is partially
explainable by the fact that it predated the Corps' acknowledgment of the binding nature of the 404(b)
guidelines. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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fining their project purposes so as to eliminate the availability of practicable alternatives. Consequently, the courts have upheld as
consistent with the guidelines wetland losses of considerable magnitude, including a 127-acre fill for a New Jersey commercial development,30 2 the conversion of 5,200 acres of Louisiana bottomland
hardwoods for soybean production, 30 3 and a seventeen-acre fill for a
log storage and export facility in Washington." 4 These losses have
been sustained despite the fact that the guidelines require permit denial for activities producing "significant degradation to the aquatic
ecosystem," irrespective of whether there exist practicable
alternatives.305
IV. EPA's

SECTION

404(c)

POWERS

Permit vetoes, authorized by section 404(c), are a sort of court of
last resort. When interagency consultation breaks down, when the
Corps denies administrative appeals, and when it interprets the 404(b)
guidelines to sanction discharges damaging to the aquatic ecosystem,
EPA has the authority to veto permit issuance. Section 404(c) has
been a relatively unused provision, but it is now receiving a good deal
of attention, and reliance on it will surely increase in the future. In
addition to authorizing permit vetoes, section 404(c) also authorizes
EPA to identify areas unsuitable for discharge in advance of any permit application, a kind of proactive zoning power not typically assigned to a federal agency. This section considers both the reactive
and proactive sides of section 404(c), along with the most notorious
404(c) action to date, the Sweeden's Swamp fill.
302. National Audubon Soc'y v. Hartz Mountain Devel. Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,724 (D.N.J. 1983) (feasible alternatives not available because other sites would offer a less attractive
marketing package to purchasers; project incorporated mitigating measures but those were deemed
insufficient by EPA and federal fish and wildlife agencies).
303. Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming six Corps general
permits against charges that the Corps limited its consideration to alternatives that would fulfill the
applicant's avowed purpose of increasing soybean production and failed to consider alternative economic uses not envisioned by the applicant, reasoning that the guidelines imposed a duty to take into

account the objectives of the applicant; not all requested fills were permitted, some mitigating measures
were included, and EPA did not object). See Fifth Circuit Upholds Corps Permits to Clear Bottomland
Hardwoods, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 19.
304.

Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming a Corps after-the-fact

permit where alternative sites were rejected as either too costly or logistically infeasible; EPA and fish
and wildlife agencies did not oppose the permit because it was conditioned on a mitigation agreement
committing the applicant to acquire substitute wetlands). See Ortman, Ninth Circuit Upholds Corps
Issuance of After-the-Fact Permit, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 11.
305. 40 C.F.R. § 230.12(a)(3)(ii) (1988); see also id. § 230.10(c); Sierra Club v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs (Westway II), 772 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1985).
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A. Permit Veto Authority
Section 404(c) was enacted in 1972 as part of the compromise
that allowed the Corps to retain its permit authority. Uneasy with
authorizing the nation's largest dredger to regulate discharges of
dredged or fill material, Congress established EPA's oversight role in
sections 404(b) and (c).3 "6 Under section 404(c), EPA may prohibit
discharges within specified areas when it determines, after public notice and an opportunity for a public hearing as well as consultation
with the Corps, that there would be an "unacceptable adverse effect on
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including
spawning and breeding areas), wildlife or recreational areas."30 7 This
broad charter confirms EPA's role as the chief 404 agency30 8 and
equips it with unprecedented, if largely overlooked, federal authority
to protect aquatic wildlife habitat.
The regulations implementing section 404(c) direct EPA to consider relevant portions of the 404(b) guidelines when considering a
404(c) action,30 9 since a basic function of section 404(c) is to police
application of the guidelines.3"' Consequently, avoidability of resource loss is a relevant 404(c) inquiry. 3 ' However, EPA used section
404(c) to veto only five permits in section 404's first fifteen years,312 in
part because of uncertainty over the force and effect of the 404(b)
306. See SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 177 (Comm. Print 1973) (joint
conference report):
The Conferees were uniquely aware of the process by which dredge and fill permits are
presently handled and did not wish to create a burdensome bureaucracy in light of the fact
that a system to issue permits already existed. At the same time, the committee did not
believe that there could be any justification for permitting the Secretary of the Army to
make the determination as to the environmental implications of either the site to be selected
or the specific spoil to be disposed of in a site. Thus, the Conferees agreed that the Administrator of the [EPA] should have the veto over the selection of the site for dredged spoil
disposal and over any specific spoil to be disposed of in any selected site.
307. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1982).
308. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing the Civiletti opinion).
309. 40 C.F.R. § 231.2(e) (1988).
310. 44 Fed. Reg. 58,078 (1979) (preamble).
311. See, e.g., Notice of Public Hearing, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,835, 33,836 (1985) (Proposed Determination to Prohibit or Restrict the Specification of an Area for Use as a Disposal Site) ("It is appropriate
under section 404(c) to take into account whether the loss of the resource is avoidable.").
312. The first veto was the North Miami landfill in 1981. In 1984, EPA vetoed another permit at
the M.A. Norden site in Mobile, Alabama. See EPA Final 404(c) Determination on Mobile Bay Disposal Site Issued, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1984, at 6-7. By 1985, three more vetoes were
completed or underway: the Jack May bank site of Jehosse Island, South Carolina, see EPA Issues
Final § 404(c) Determination Prohibiting Impoundment of South Carolina Wetlands, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., May-June 1985, at 5-6; the Bayou Aux Carpes site in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, see
EPA Issues Final § 404(c) Determination Restricting Discharges in Louisiana Wetlands Site, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 2-3; and Sweeden's Swamp, see Eggert, Out With the Old. In
With the New. The Corps' Controversial Interpretation of the § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, NAT'L WETLANDS
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guidelines3" 3 and in part because of the relatively low priority accorded the 404 program within EPA, at least until recently. But the
Sweeden's Swamp case indicates that EPA may be preparedt 4 to be a
3
much more aggressive implementer of 404(c) in the future.
B. The Sweeden's Swamp Veto

The controversy over the Sweeden's Swamp fill illustrates the tension between EPA and the Corps, their divergent interpretations of

when practicable alternatives are available, and the circumstances
under which mitigation in the form of substitute resources can justify
a discharge. The case arose when a developer, Pyramid Companies,
decided to construct a shopping mall in the Attleboro, Massachusetts,
area.3 1 5 Pyramid surveyed available sites, including one in North Attleboro containing only one acre of wetlands. It decided, however, to
purchase Sweeden's Swamp, a 49-acre red maple swamp that EPA,
the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the New England Division of the
Corps determined furnished excellent wildlife habitat. In July 1984,
Pyramid applied to the Corps for a permit to fill thirty-two acres of the
swamp. It proposed to mitigate this loss by attempting to convert nine
acres of uplands into a marsh and to create another thirty-six acres offsite at a gravel pit some two miles away.
EPA objected to issuance of the permit. The Corps' New England Division initially indicated it would deny the permit based on the
availability of the North Attleboro site. But because that site was sub-

sequently purchased by a competing developer, the Corps' Deputy Director for Civil Works directed that the permit be issued. He further
NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 2-4. See also 52 Fed. Reg. 29,431, 38,519 (1987) (notices of proposed
§ 404(c) vetoes in Hackensack Meadowlands, N.J., and Taylor Slough, near Miami, Fla.).
313. See supra notes 60, 98-99 and accompanying text.
314. The recent announcement of EPA's intention to veto the § 404 permit application to construct the Two Forks Dam in Colorado may signal further EPA assertiveness. On March 24, 1989,
EPA Administrator William Reilly announced his view that, despite Corps approval and a favorable
recommendation from the outgoing Regional Administrator, the Two Forks project permit application
required a veto under § 404(c). See Obmascik, EPA to Veto Two Forks Dam, Denver Post. Mar. 25,
1989, at IA, col. 1. After the Administrator's announcement, the new Regional Administrator for
Region VIII, Lee DeHihns, began to conduct an independent inquiry into whether Two Forks required
a veto. His view is likely to concur with that of the Administrator. See Obmascik, Two Forks Backers
Spend Big, Won't Quit, Denver Post, June 18, 1989, at IA, col. 1.
315. See generally Klein, Bersani v. EPA: The EPA's Authority Under the Clean Water Act to Veto
Wetland-Filling Per, mits, 19 ENVTL. L. 389 (1989). EPA Issues Final .§ 404(c) Determination Prohibiting Filling ofSweedens Swamp, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1986, at 10-12; Liebesman, The
"Sweedens Swamp" Controversy-Focusing on EPA's Role in the Clean Water Act § 404 Program,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEwsL., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 15; see also 51 Fed. Reg. 22,977 (1986) (Final Determination of the Assistant Administrator for External Affairs Concerning the Sweedens Swamp Site); 50
Fed. Reg. 33,835-33,836 (1985).
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determined that because of Pyramid's proposed mitigation measures,
no other site could be environmentally preferable. 31 6
EPA's Regional Administrator recommended a veto on grounds
317
of adverse wildlife effects and the availability of alternative sites.
EPA headquarters agreed, reasoning that, (1) even if Pyramid's wetland creation plan was entirely successful, the new wetlands would not
eliminate adverse effects on wildlife; (2) this loss was "unacceptable"
within the meaning of section 404(c) because it was avoidable through
use of an available alternative; and (3) the North Attleboro site was
available to Pyramid, even though it was subsequently purchased by
another developer, because the determination of availability is not limited to the time of permit application but includes the developer's entire site selection process.3 1 According to EPA, given the primitive
state of wetland creation science,
mitigation measures based on
manmade wetlands cannot substitute for analysis of available alternative sites. EPA believed that such a policy would encourage developers to turn first to the uncertain technology of wetland creation,
replacing established, naturally functioning wetlands with manmade
316. The reasoning went as follows:
If mitigation measures can fully compensate for all adverse impacts of a proposed discharge

on the aquatic environment, then the adverse effects of [that] ... discharge... [are] zero.
Since no alternative could have [a] less adverse environmental effect than zero, 100 [per-

cent] mitigation would allow the satisfaction of the ...

guidelines requirement, even if a

practicable upland alternative site might be available.
Quoted in Eggert, supra note 312, at 3; see also 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (1988) (Corps mitigation policy).
The Corps regulations state that this mitigation policy is not a substitute for the mitigation requirements in the 404(b)(1) guidelines, and note that an interagency working group is developing guidance to

implement the guidelines' mitigation requirements. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) n.l.
317. See EPA Issues Final § 404(c) Determination, supra note 315, at 11. Pyramid sought unsuccessfully to overturn the Regional Administrator's decision, arguing that he had taken too long to make
his decision. See Bersani v. Deland, 640 F. Supp. 716 (D. Mass. 1986) (neither the Clean Water Act
nor applicable regulations place a time limit on the Regional Administrator). Earlier, Pyramid unsuccessfully sought to persuade a different district court to enjoin the initiation of 404(c) proceedings.
Newport Galleria Group v. Deland, 618 F. Supp. 1179 (D.D.C. 1985).
318. 51 Fed. Reg. 22,977 (1986); see EPA Issues Final § 404(c) Determination, supra note 315, at
11-12:
[W]hether the North Attleboro site is or is not the best site within the trade area from a
specific applicant's business perspective is not the issue. The practicable alternatives test
requires only that other sites be feasible, not that they be equal or better ....
Neither the
[Clean Water Act] nor the Guidelines require an applicant to probe the availability of a site
that the applicant believes is unsuitable for its project. That is a judgment for the applicant
to make. But in making that judgment, the applicant runs the risk that the marketplace
will call into question the determination of unsuitability, and that the applicant will then be
left without proof that the alternative site was also unavailable. That is the case here.
(Original emphasis). See also Klein, supra note 315, at 397-403 (discussing EPA's definition of practicable alternatives).
319. See infra note 467 and accompanying text (50% of mitigation projects fail); see also infra
note 320.
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creations of questionable value.3 2 ° These determinations were upheld
as reasonable by a district court in late 1987 and affirmed by the Second Circuit in mid-1988. 3 2'
The Sweeden's Swamp result shows a decided judicial deference
to EPA. Three district courts in three different circuits all declined to
interfere with EPA's 404(c) determinations.3 2 2 Thus, EPA may employ 404(c) to conduct an independent evaluation to override aberrant
interpretations of the 404(b) guidelines by the Corps,323 such as its
conclusion that wetlands loss accompanied by compensation of manmade mitigation could be the environmentally preferred alternative.3 24
Moreover, judicial ratification of EPA's "market entry" test to judge
the availability of alternative sites and sanction of EPA's hard look at
the feasibility of alternatives make 404(c) a formidable, if less than
ideal,325 vehicle for wetlands protection. 2 6
320. EPA reasoned:
To accept [mitigation] under these conditions would.., encourage developers to seek novel
mitigation measures, not alternatives, and would undermine the predictability of the permit'
process. We would find ourselves drawn, as in this case, into assessments of mitigation
approaches for which we will be able to make, at best, only qualitative judgments based on
uncertain knowledge. As the technology develops, there might well be a case in which even
offsite, out of kind wetland creation would be so beneficial and so reliable as to justify an
exception. This plainly is not the case here.
EPA Issues Final § 404(c) Determination, supra note 315, at 12. For a review of the state of the art in
wetland mitigation, see the articles in Focus, NAT'L WETLANDs NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 2-17; see
also Kunz, Rylko & Somers, An Assessment of Wetland Mitigation Practices in Washington State,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., May-June 1988, at 2 (finding, among other things, that 35 planned mitiga-

tion projects between 1980 and 1986 still resulted in a substantial loss of wetland acreage and diversity,
that mitigation designs were not effectively incorporated into 404 permits, and that monitoring was
sparse); Hadley, New Wetlands: Fooling With Mother Nature, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 22, 1988,
at B3, col. 3 (quoting from an EPA study that concluded most mitigation projects fail and "Itlhe
science of wetlands creation and restoration is far behind the regulatory use of its techniques").
321. Bersani v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd,
850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988); cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1556 (1989); see Kilgore, EPA's Evolving Role in
Wetlands Protection:Elaboration in Bersani v. U.S.E.P.A., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,479
(1988); Klein, supra note 315.
322. See supra cases cited notes 317, 321; see also Creppel v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 19
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,134 (E.D. La. 1988) (upholding an EPA veto of a flood control
project as not being arbitrary and capricious).
323. According to the Corps/EPA Memorandum of Agreement, the Corps retains the authority
to interpret the 404(b) guidelines. See 1985 EPA/CoRs MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note
264, § 5(d), at 2; see also supra text accompanying note 290.
324. See supra note 316.
325. The "market entry" test showed the existence of an available alternative in the Sweeden's
Swamp case only because another developer purchased the North Attleboro site that Pyramid considered but rejected. See text accompanying notes 315-316. Had that site not been purchased by a competitor, it would have been difficult for EPA to rebut Pyramid's claims that the site was unsuitable
because of a lack of visibility from and ready access to a highway. Telephone interview with Douglas
A. Thompson, Attorney, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Region I (Boston) (Jan. 10, 1989).
326. See Liebesman, supra note 315, at 16-17 (noting also, however, that the case leaves unanswered how far back in time an applicant must search under the "market entry" test).
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C Prospective Prohibitions
Section 404(c) also enables EPA to identify areas unsuitable for
discharges before a discharge is proposed. 327 These prohibitions could
be used to protect critical aquatic areas prior to the development of
site-specific controversies and also would help to increase the predictability of 404 regulation. 32 EPA has yet to place much emphasis on
this aspect of its 404(c) power, but it has begun to designate certain
areas as unlikely to receive 404 permits under the "advanced identification" provision of the 404(b) guidelines.3 29 Although advanced
identification does not prohibit subsequent discharges, it can be an effective vehicle to promote public understanding of wetland values and
threats to those values: Its use will almost surely increase in the
future.3 3 o
V. ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement cases increasingly occupy center stage in 404 regulation, an unsurprising fact for a program with about 400 cases pending
in mid-1987. 3 3' Section 404 enforcement raises issues not generally
encountered in other Clean Water Act provisions. For example, unlike National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 332 (NPDES)
permit cases, 404 enforcement typically involves individuals or, if corporations are involved, major development plans. Neither type of discharger is as likely to regard the resolution of a 404 enforcement
proceeding as a "cost of doing business," and both are more likely to
contest federal enforcement. Moreover, unlike NPDES cases, where
discharge monitoring reports rarely leave facts in dispute, 404 defendants usually raise a number of defenses based on disputed facts, such
as whether the discharge was in a wetland, whether it was a "normal"
farming practice, whether proffered mitigation reduced a project's adverse impacts below the "significance" threshold, and so forth. These
327. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1982) (EPA Administrator "is authorized to prohibit the specification
...of any defined area as a disposal site"); see 40 C.F.R. § 231.1 (1988).
328. See Cooper, Wetlands or Wastelands?, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1985, at 4-5;
Nagle, supra note 98, at 249-50.
329. 40 C.F.R. § 230.80 (1988); see Tripp & Herz, supra note 7, at 249 n.116 (discussing advanced identification in the Hackensack Meadowlands and in the Lower Hudson Estuary); Shields,
Wetlands Advance Identification Program in Southern Maine, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.-Feb.
1988, at 2; Furst, A New Approach to Wetlands Protection for Nebraska's Rainwater Basin, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1986, at 5-7.
330. See Davis, Wetlands Conservation Since 1970: One Observer's Reflections, NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 2, 4.
331. Oral remarks of Peggy Strand at Washington Conference on the Clean Water Act's Section
404 Program (May 29, 1987).
332. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
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peculiarities will make 404 enforcement a lively area of litigation in the
future.
Section 404 divides enforcement responsibilities between EPA
and the Corps, restricting the latter to permit violations. 3 3 Only EPA
possesses authority to enforce against unauthorized discharges,3 34
which constitute by far the bulk of enforcement cases.3 3 5 Nevertheless, the Corps does in fact routinely take enforcement action against
unauthorized dischargers with the tacit approval of EPA.3 3 6 However, inconsistent and frequently extremely lenient enforcement has
encouraged landowners to fill and developers to speculate on wetlands
development.33 7 More often than not, such fills have been given retroactive sanction by the Corps, a practice the National Wildlife Federation has criticized as putting figurative headstones on the burial
3 38
grounds of the nation's wetlands.
The 1987 amendments to section 404 expanded the enforcement
powers of both the Corps and EPA to include imposition of administrative penalties, 339 but the amendments left the general division of
enforcement authority intact. Remedies for violations include injunctive relief, including restoration orders, and civil and criminal penalties. In addition to government-initiated enforcement, citizens may
institute enforcement actions. This section surveys the chief 404 enforcement issues.
A. Detecting Violations
The intergovernmental nature of the 404 program is nowhere better illustrated than in enforcement. In addition to the division of enforcement powers between EPA and the Corps, federal and state fish
and wildlife agencies are frequently the motivating forces behind enforcement actions, since they often first detect alleged violations."4
Corps regulations encourage reporting of violations by other agencies
333. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(s) (1982).
334. Unauthorized discharges, as well as permit violations, are violations of section 301(a) ofthe
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), subject to EPA's enforcement authority under § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.

335. Remarks of Ms. Strand, supra note 331.
336. Letter from Douglas A. Thompson, supra note 162 (noting that there have been no successful challenges to Corps enforcement against unauthorized discharges); GAO Report, supra note 12, at 61
(describing a "gentlemen's agreement" between EPA Region IlI and the Corps' Baltimore District,
resulting in the Corps assuming the bulk of enforcement work against unauthorized discharges).
337. See Tripp & Herz, supra note 7, at 228.
338. National Wildlife Federation Comments, supra note 5, at 34.
339. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 314, 101 Stat. 7, 47 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g) (Supp. V 1987)).
340. See, e.g., In re Alameda County Assessor's Parcels, 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1279 (N.D. Cal.
1987); United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 83 (W.D. Ky. 1987). aff'd, 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir.
1988); United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972405

1989]

FEDERAL WETLANDS PROTECTION

and the public, as well as joint surveillance procedures. 34 ' Aerial surveillance is not uncommon,34 2 and search warrants to confirm suspected discharges not unprecedented. 34 3
Once a violation is detected, both EPA and the Corps may issue
cease and desist orders prohibiting further discharges and perhaps ordering initial corrective measures. 344 Corps regulations instruct District Engineers to consult EPA, federal fish and wildlife agencies, and
other interested agencies for advice on the appropriate nature of these
corrective measures. 345 The Corps may nevertheless ratify an illegal
discharge by issuing an after-the-fact permit, 346 but not without applying the 404(b) guidelines and not if EPA or any other federal, state or
local agency is pursuing enforcement action, unless "clearly
347
.appropriate."
The National Wildlife Federation recently alleged that the Corps
rarely enforces cease and desist orders in court, usually ratifying the
illegal activity by issuing an after-the-fact permit.3 48 For example, in
response to a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service report of a fill at the
Russo site in the New Jersey Hackensack Meadowlands, the Corps
issued a cease and desist letter in 1981 but failed to take further enforcement action. 349 Three years later, the Fish and Wildlife Service
informed the Corps of further illegal fills for warehouse construction.
Again the Corps failed to act. A year later, in 1985, the Corps finally
issued a cease and desist order. Undeterred, the discharger purchased
additional wetlands for filling. The Corps' response was to issue an
after-the-fact permit for forty-four acres of fill on the original tract and
eight acres on the new tract and also to issue an individual permit for
filling of five additional acres on the new tract, requiring compensation
for only half of the lost wetlands.
Other similar examples of lax enforcement were noted in the 1988
General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the 404 program.3 50 The
Corps' defense, according to GAO, is that "[t]he Corps has tradition341. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(a) (1988).
342. See, e.g., United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 82-83 (W.D. Ky. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d
189 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Rivera Torres, 656 F. Supp. 251, 251 (D.P.R.' 1987), aff'd, 826
F.2d 151 (Ist Cir. 1987); United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (W.D. Tenn. 1987),
343. See, e.g., In re Alameda County Assessor's Parcels, 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1286-87 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (sanctioning a search warrant for EPA under § 308 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982)).

344. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(3) (EPA authority), 1344(s)(1) (Corps authority).
345. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(d) (1988).
346. See supra notes 227-236 and accompanying text.
33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e)(1)(iv); see also id. § 326.3(e)(2).
National Wildlife Federation Comments, supra note 5, at 34.
349. See id. at 34-36 (discussing the Russo site).
350. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 55-58, 65-72.
347.
348.
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ally viewed seeking voluntary compliance rather than punitive legal
action as 'good government.'"351 As the Wildlife Federation noted,
"Sanctioning wetlands destruction is not good government, it is no
government.

3 52

The GAO report concluded that neither EPA nor the Corps has
implemented an effective program of detecting violations. GAO found
that in none of the five districts it studied was surveillance a high priority, that the Corps seldom inspects permit sites, that the Corps frequently delays investigating suspected unauthorized activities for long
periods, and that EPA assumes only a limited enforcement role.353
GAO depicted the Corps as preoccupied with individual permit
processing and relatively unconcerned with wetland losses due to unpermitted activities or permit violations.354 Aerial surveillance, the
most effective means of uncovering violations, has been cut drastically
at all five Corps districts that GAO studied,35 5 and one Corps district
assumed a passive role concerning surveillance out of fear that a more
active role would uncover too much additional work for its limited
resources.3 56 GAO recommended that if the loss of valuable wetlands
is to be avoided EPA and the Corps must establish a coordinated 404
enforcement program that includes routine surveillance, compliance
inspections, and investigation and reporting of unauthorized
activities.3 5 7
B. Restoration Orders
Injunctions to restrain discharges are the usual remedy sought by
government enforcement actions, 358 but because of the cease and desist authority possessed by both EPA and the Corps, there is less urgency to obtain temporary equitable relief. Instead, the focus is on
permanent relief, often including restoration orders. Restoration orders, by which the courts direct unauthorized dischargers to remove
their fills or replace the aquatic resources destroyed by their activities,
were first authorized in section 12 of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
351. Id. at 72.
352. National Wildlife Federation Comments, supra note 5, at 36 (emphasis in original).
353. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 55-56.
354. Id. at 33, 55-60, 62-65, 90.
355. Id. at 57-58.
356. Id. at 56.
357. Id. at 73-74. See infra note 388 (describing the 1989 Corps-EPA Memorandum of Agreement on Enforcement).
358. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera Torres, 656 F. Supp. 251 (D.P.R. 1987); United States v.
Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984). Section 309(b) of the Clean Water Act authorizes both
temporary and permanent injunctions. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982).
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Act.3 59 They supply an important means to carry out the Clean Water
Act's policy of preserving and restoring the physical and biological
integrity of the nation's waters, 3 ° which the legislative history makes
clear includes protection and restoration of wetlands.36 '
Since injunctive relief is not automatic for violation of Clean
Water Act permit requirements, 362 neither is an order to restore the
environment. Nevertheless, courts have issued restoration orders with
some frequency. 363 The usual prerequisite is a government restoration
plan that confers maximum environmental benefits, is feasible, and is
equitably related to the aquatic damage inflicted. 364 The equities often
demand only partial restoration. 36 And sometimes restoration has
been denied, such as when 1) the advance of federal jurisdiction confused both the discharger and the Corps,3 6 6 2) the Corps failed to take
action within a reasonable time,3 67 3) the court determined the discharge to be de minimis, 368 or 4) there was no specific restoration plan
submitted. 69 However, plans meeting the criteria above are regularly
imposed upon illegal dischargers.3 7 °
359. 33 U.S.C. § 406.
360. Id. § 1251(a).
361. SEN. COMM. ON THE ENVIRONMENT, 95TH CONG., 2D Sass., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN WATER AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, at 532 (Comm. Print 1978) (committee explana-

tion); see also id. at 869-70 (statement of Sen. Muskie).
362. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (violation of§ 301 for discharging without a permit does not automatically warrant injunction).
363. See generally 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.13, at 211-16; Want, supra note 25, at 46-51
(providing thorough discussion of pre-1984 § 10 and § 404 cases).
364. Perhaps the best-known restoration cases are the Fifth Circuit's trilogy, United States v.
Sexton Cove Estates, 526 F.2d 1293, 1301 (5th Cir. 1976); Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976). For a detailed
analysis of these cases, see Rouvalis, Restoration of Wetlands Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act:
An Analytic Synthesis of Statutory and Case Law Principles, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 295, 310-15
(1988).
365. United States v. Context-Marks Corp., 729 F.2d 1294 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (restoration orders
should be based on examination of environmental factors and practicalities); United States v. Sexton
Cove Estates, 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Sunset Cove Estates, 514 F.2d 1089 (9th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
366. Buccaneer Point Estates v. United States, 729 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1984).
367. United States v. Boccanfuso, 695 F. Supp. 693 (D. Conn. 1988) (Corps failure to respond to
a permit application for six months sufficient to estop later enforcement action).
368. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. at 373.
369. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F.2d 1501, 1507 (1 th Cir. 1985). For an able
criticism of the courts' handling of cases seeking restoration, see Rouvalis, supra note 364 (arguing that
the courts have employed traditional equitable balancing principles to undermine the principle of
achieving maximum environmental benefits).
370. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Tenn. 1987); United States v.
Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76 (W.D. Ky. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Mass. 1986); United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610 (ED. Va.
1983), afftd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987).
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C. Civil Penalties
The remedial nature of restoration orders is complemented by the
authority to seek civil penalties that clearly include a punitive element. 7 ' A number of courts have imposed penalties in excess of
$50,000, largely for deterrent effect.3 72 However, often a civil penalty
is a means to ensure that restoration work is completed: By reducing
or eliminating the penalty after completion of the work, courts command the discharger's attention to remedial measures.3 73
Judicial imposition of civil penalties will become more complex in
the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Tull v. United States, 74
where the Court ruled that the seventh amendment guarantee-that
all common law suits involving more than $20 be tried before a juryrequires a jury trial on the issue of whether civil penalties should be
imposed. According to the Court, civil penalties are intended, at least

in part, to punish; they therefore are analogous to common law actions
in debt, which necessitated jury trials. 3"

But while the issue of

whether to impose civil penalties now must go to the jury, the Court
made plain that the amount of the penalty remains in the discretion of
the trial judge.3 76

Tull means that imposition of civil penalties will require more
litigation resources, but dischargers are unlikely to benefit significantly. First, the result should not affect imposition of administrative

penalties that the 1987 amendments authorized.

77

Second, it clearly

371. See Tull v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1838 (1987) (relying on the 1977 legislative history
and EPA's penalty to conclude that Congress intended civil penalties to serve retributive and deterrent
as well as compensatory functions; retribution to be based on seriousness of violation and lack of good
faith).
372. See, e.g., United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming a penalty of
S325,000), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S.Ct. 1831 (1987); United States v. Conrad, 745 F.2d 70 (1Ith
Cir. 1984) (affirming a penalty of $100,000); United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1987)
($235,000); United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Mass. 1986) ($150,000).
373. See, e.g., United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76 (W.D. Ky. 1987) ($40,000 penalty, to be
forgiven if restoration completed within six months), aff'd, 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988); cf United
States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (reserving ruling on amount of penalty until the
court had an opportunity to review restoration plan).
374. 107 S.Ct. 1831 (1987). See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ....).
375. 107 S.Ct. at 1838-39 (also distinguishing civil penalties from a public nuisance action, where
the remedy is usually injunctive relief); see supra note 371.
376. Id. at 1839-40.
377. See infra
notes 382-390 and accompanying text. In Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), the Court determined that imposition of
administrative penalties did not require ajury trial, since in authorizing such penalties Congress did not
intend thereby "to choke the already crowded federal courts." Id. at 455. See Openchowski, Changing
the Nature of Federal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,304,
10,307-10 (1987) (also suggesting that Tull might produce greater reliance on negotiated settlements).
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makes no change regarding injunctive relief, such as restoration orders.378 Third, at least one jury imposed civil penalties against a landowner-developer who unlawfully filled wetlands in western
Pennsylvania.3 79 It is possible, however, that Tull might make less
likely the award of alternative relief, whereby substantial civil penalties are forgiven upon completion of remedial work.3 80 Fourth, government attorneys, faced with increased transaction costs in seeking
civil penalties, are likely to proceed more frequently with criminal
prosecutions.3 81
D. Administrative Penalties
The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act added significant
new administrative penalties to the Act's enforcement arsenal.382 In
section 309(g) of the Act, Congress continued to divide enforcement
authority between EPA and the Corps, giving EPA the ability to levy
administrative penalties against unauthorized dischargers and violators of state-issued 404 permits, while authorizing the Corps to impose
similar penalties on federal 404 permit violators. 38 3 Two types of penalties were authorized: Class 1 penalties, which may not exceed a total
of $25,000, and Class 2 penalties, which may not exceed $125,000. 384
The former require written notice to the violator and an opportunity
to request an informal hearing within thirty days of the notice; the
latter require more formal procedures, including an opportunity for an
adjudicatory hearing on the record.38 5
378. One court did employ Tull and concluded that, because they are retributive in nature, civil
penalties do not survive the death of the discharger. However, his estate was liable for restoration
measures. United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204, 1214-15 (W.D. Tenn. 1987). Note that because the seventh amendment does not apply to the states, Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 211 (1916), Tull should have no effect on state enforcement.
379. See Miller, Jury Finds Defendant in Violation of Clean Water Act § 404, NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 8.
380. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
381. Remarks of Jerry Jackson, National Wildlife Federation Counsel, at the Western Public
Interest Law Conference (Mar. 5, 1988). Examples of cases imposing criminal penalties include United
States v. Marathon Devel. Corp., 867 F.2d 96 (Ist Cir. 1989) (affirming criminal convictions for an
unauthorized discharge; corporate defendant fined $100,000 and senior vice president received sixmonth suspended sentence and $10,000 fine); United States v. Mills, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2633 (N.D.
Fla. Apr. 13, 1989) (two Florida men sentenced to 21 months in prison for unauthorized wetland fills;

first use in an environmental case of the federal sentencing guidelines recently upheld by the Supreme
Court in Mistretta v. United States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4102 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1989)).
382. See Liebesman & Laws, The Water Quality Act of 1987. A Major Step in Assuring the Quality
of the Nation's Waters, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,311, 10,317-19 (1987).

383. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(l)(A), (B)(Supp. V 1988).
384. Id. § 1319(g)(2)(A), (B). Class I penalties may not exceed $10,000 per violation, while Class
II penalties may not exceed $10,000 per day for each day during which the violation continues. Id.
385. ld.
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Congress specified a number of factors that EPA and the Corps
must take into account in imposing administrative penalties, including
the seriousness of the violation, the resulting economic benefit, any
38 6
past violations, and the violator's ability to pay and to do business.
It also foreclosed judicial enforcement actions, including citizen suits,
concerning violations for which EPA or the Corps is "diligently prosecuting" an administrative penalty or when such a penalty has been
paid.38 7 The legislative history reveals that Congress expected EPA
and the Corps to use this new administrative penalty "aggressively"
and to develop a memorandum of agreement concerning implementation of administrative penalties against unauthorized discharges.38 8
386. Id. § 1319(g)(3).
387. Id. § 1319 (g)(6); see also 133 CONG. REC. S737 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987) (remarks of Sen.
Chaffee).
388. 133 CONG. REC. S737 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Chaffee); see also H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 138-39 (1986) (memorandum to be signed within six
months of enactment of the amendments).
On January 19, 1989, the same day the Corps and EPA signed the Jurisdiction Memorandum of
Agreement, supra note 151, the two agencies signed two MOAs on enforcement. The first, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CONCERNING FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT FOR THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM OF THE

CLEAN WATER ACT (Jan. 19, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 CORPs-EPA ENFORCEMENT MOA], attempts to
"establish a framework for effective Section 404 enforcement with very little overlap" by committing
most 404 enforcement issues to the Corps because of its greater field resources. Id. § IIA. Under the
agreement, the Corps will be the lead agency for enforcement for all violations of Corps-issued permits,
as well as for all unpermitted discharges that do not fall into one of four categories where EPA will
have the lead. Lead agency enforcement decisions are final, including decisions to take no enforcement
action, id. § lID, although EPA may refer a case to the Corps, and the Corps may then take action
"commensurate with resource availability." Id. § IIID(2). The Corps may also refer violations of permit conditions to EPA for action "commensurate with resource availability," but there are no similar
referral procedures for unpermitted discharges (see id. §§ IIID(2) and IIID(4)), which are governed by
the second MOA described below. The four categories of violations for which EPA has the lead are: 1)
repeat violators; 2) flagrant violations; 3) where EPA requests a class of cases or a particular case; and
4) where the Corps recommends that an EPA administrative penalty may be warranted. Id. § IIID(l).
While this enables EPA to take the lead on enforcement in any particular case, the MOA is not clear as
to whether EPA may do so in a case where the Corps has begun investigation but not yet reached a
decision. See Ransel, supra note 152, at 3-4.
The second MOA on enforcement, SECTION 404 ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
(MOA) PROCEDURES REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF PREVIOUSLY-ISSUED CORPS PERMITS
(Jan. 19, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 CORPS PERMIT MOA], establishes procedures for EPA to follow when
it discovers an allegedly unpermitted discharge. EPA must notify the Corps and give it an opportunity
to determine if the discharge has been authorized by an individual or general permit. Id. § 3. The
Corps then has either two or ten days (depending on the amount of information supplied by EPA) to
make the determination, id. § 5, which represents final enforcement action. Id § 4. If it fails to do so,
EPA may continue to investigate and decide whether a violation exists. Id. § 5. However, EPA may
take immediate enforcement action, irrespective of these procedures, "when necessary to minimize impacts to the environment." Id. § 6.
These enforcement MOAs clarify enforcement responsibilities and may make enforcement action
more efficient, but they are hardly a solution to the enforcement shortcomings depicted by the GAO,
supra notes 353-357 and accompanying text. The MOAs commit no additional resources to enforcement, and one must question the wisdom of allocating final enforcement authority outside of designated
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The GAO concluded that the new administrative penalty provisions, "If properly implemented," could serve as an effective deterrent
to 404 violations, especially concerning smaller projects. a89 Certainly
the new authority offers some hope of reversing the 404 program's
sorry enforcement record. As the National Wildlife Federation recently alleged, "If the United States enforced its tax laws the way it is
enforcing its wetlands laws, this country would be financially
bankrupt. '"39
E. Citizen Suits
While citizen suits have been critical in compelling the Corps to
recognize and maintain the scope of the 404 program,3 9' the citizen
role in enforcement has not been as prominent as elsewhere in the
Clean Water Act.3 92 This may be explainable by the fact that 404
enforcement often turns on whether in fact a discharge occurred in a
"water of the United States," whereas most enforcement actions
39 3
claiming violations of section 402 involve no such arguable terms.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, where the Court ruled that citizens could not bring
suits based wholly on past violations, 394 is unlikely to affect 404 citizen
enforcement. Illegal discharges of dredged or fill material remain statutory violations until they are permitted; they therefore are not past,
but present, violations of the statute. 39 5 However, two other recent
decisions-one ruling that the Corps cannot be compelled to enforce
its permit conditions 396 and the other denying judicial relief in the abspecial cases to the Corps, an agency with such a poor enforcement record. See supra notes 348-357
and accompanying text.
389. GAO Report, supro note 12, at 61.

390. National Wildlife Federation Comments, supra note 5, at 37.
391. See supra parts I.D. and I.G. (discussing NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.
1975), and National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, No. 82-3632 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 22, 1982)).
392. See Meier, 'Citizen Suits'Become a Popular Weapon In the FightAgainst IndustrialPolluters,
Wall St. J.,
Apr. 17, 1987, at 17, col. 4 (discussing the "citizen suit campaign" under § 402 of the Clean
Water Act); Thomas, Citizen Suits and the NPDES Program: A Review of Clean Water Act Decisions,
17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,050 (1987); see generally J.MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987); Comment, The Rise of Citizen-Suit
Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 Nw. U.L.
REV. 220 (1987).

393. See Thomas, supra note 392 (discussing suits where permit noncompliance is based on the
permittee's own periodic discharge monitoring reports).
394. 108 S.Ct. 376 (1987) (good faith allegations of intermittent or ongoing violations necessary).

See also supra note 233.
395. In order to transform a present violation into a past violation, the discharger should have to
demonstrate "remedial steps that had clearly achieved the effect of curing all past violations by the time

(the citizen] suit was brought." 108 S. Ct. at 388 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
396. Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh, 815 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1987).
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potentially severe

VI. THE TAKINGS ISSUE

The fifth amendment prohibition against the taking of private
property for public use without compensation3 8 has always lurked in
the background of 404 regulation. Once it became clear that permit
jurisdiction extended beyond the traditional navigability confines, permit denials could no longer be insulated from scrutiny under the takings clause by the obscure navigation servitude doctrine.39 9 Since the
theory behind the takings clause is that justice and fairness limit the
burdens society can impose on individual property owners,' the issue
in 404 regulation is: When has a permit denial transgressed those ideals so that compensation is due? To date, judicial declarations of takings due to 404 permit denial have been virtually nonexistent.4 "'
Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court rulings are sure to encourage increased allegations of regulatory takings. 1 2 This section examines the
taking issue and 404 regulation in the context of these developments.
A. 404 Takings Jurisprudence
Section 404 takings claims seeking monetary compensation in excess of $10,000 are heard initially in the Claims Court (formerly the
Court of Claims), not federal district courts.4 "3 Until 1986, the leading 404 takings case concerned the Deltona Corporation's plans to
397. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher (Pond 12), 662 F. Supp. 548, 550 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
(declining to order restoration or impose a fine for an illegal fill where the Corps and EPA took no
enforcement action). See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text for further analysis of the case.
398. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally D. CAI.LIES, F. BOSSELMAN & J. BANTA, THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1973); 40 C.F.R. § 233.23 (1988) (state 404 program approval requirement that state attorney general analyze state law of regulatory takings); see also Seltzer & Steinberg, Wetlands and Private
Development, 12 COLUM J. ENVTL. L. 159, 184-96 (1987).
399. See 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.14 (examining the navigation servitude); see also
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) (navigation servitude part of the federal government's commerce power).
400. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); see
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-6 (2d ed. 1988).

401. The only reported case not subsequently overturned that declares the denial of a 404 permit
to be a taking was 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v, Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983), discussed in Want,
The Taking Defense To Wetlands Regulation, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,169, 10.173-75
(1984) (distinguishing the case on the court's willingness to overrule the Corps on the value of the
wetlands at issue, and its faulty rulings on Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdiction and the water dependency test).
402. See infra notes 423-429 and accompanying text.
403. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982), gives the Claims Court (formerly the Court of
Claims) exclusive jurisdiction over suits for money damages in excess of $10,000 against the federal
government. Claims Court decisions are appealed to the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
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convert thousands of acres of mangrove wetlands on Marco Island in
coastal Florida to "finger-fill" residential development. Deltona was
caught in the expansion of 404 jurisdiction, having purchased the
property in 1964 and received section 10 permits to develop two of its
five tracts prior to enactment of section 404.' ° However, in 1976 the
Corps denied 404 permits for two of the three remaining tracts, and
Deltona claimed a regulatory taking. 5
The Court of Claims rejected Deltona's assertion, even though
conceding that the Corps had "substantially frustrated" the developer's "reasonable investment-backed expectation. '"16 The court
ruled that Deltona failed to show the denial left it with "no economically viable use of its land,",1 7 citing the fact that development was
foreclosed only on one-third of its total planned lots. Even on those
tracts denied permits there were sufficient uplands not requiring permits to double Deltona's initial investment. ° 8 The court specifically
rejected Deltona's argument that its property was taken because it was
denied its most profitable use.'
Also rejected was the allegation that
the earlier permit approvals created a reasonable expectation of subsequent approvals; the only expectation that was reasonable, according
to the court, was one of economical use, considering the property as a
whole.41 °
The Deltona test is one that few frustrated developers can satisfy. 4 " Its broad view of the property to be considered in determining
whether there is an economically viable use-accounting for both permitted activities and activities beyond the reach of regulation-should
404. Deltona received one § 10 permit for the Marco River area in 1964, when the Corps' permit
criteria were limited to considering likely effects on navigation, and another for the Roberts Bay area in
1969 under the Corps' public interest review. See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1188
(Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
405. The Corps denied permits for Barfield Bay and Big Key, while granting permits for development of the Collier Bay tract. Id. at 1188-89.
406. Id.at 1192 (relying on Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
407. Id. (relying on Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
408. Id. (noting the existence of I I acres of uplands with the Barfield Bay and Big Key tracts
with a total market value of $2.5 million, while Deltona paid only $1.24million for all of those tracts).
409. Id. at 1193 (diminution of value alone insufficient for a taking).
410. Id. at 1192-93 (relying on Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978)).
The Deltona case was ultimately settled when Deltona agreed to transfer title to some 15,000 acres
of wetlands in exchange for 150 acres of commercially zoned real estate, along with governmental
support for an upland, high-rise cluster with the same number of units as the developer had originally
proposed. Tripp & Herz, supra note 7, at 228 n.27.
411. In a companion case to Deltona, Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), the
Court of Claims rejected a similar takings claim based on denial of permits to fill Florida mangroves.
The court found no taking because the upper range of the estimated value of the property's uplands (20
acres) and those wetlands that the Corps offered to permit (20 of the 80 acres applied for) was equal to
the amount Jentgen originally paid for the property.
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insulate most 404 decisions from takings clause violations because
most permits are not denied outright" 2 and most developers own adjacent uplands. A successful takings claim apparently would require a
tract of property almost entirely wetlands, the economic viability of
which was wholly dependent on transforming those wetlands.
Such an unusual situation in fact materialized, again in Florida,
where a limestone miner wished to transform its suburban Miami wetlands into a lake in the process of its mining operations. Denied a 404
permit (in large measure due to objections by EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and other federal, state, and local agencies) 413 Florida
Rock Industries claimed a taking and was awarded over $1 million by
a claims court judge. 4 4 This result was overturned by the Federal
Circuit in 1986 because, while the 404 permit denial foreclosed mining, it did not inhibit other economically viable uses such as sale of the
property. According to the appellate court, the government could
successfully defend against a taking by showing an increase in the burdened property's fair market value, even if that value was due to the
willingness of speculators to purchase the property in the hope that
regulatory policies might change in the future. 4' 5
Although the peculiar value of the limestone wetlands in suburban Miami may foreclose a taking in that situation, and the Federal
Circuit's fair market value test is effectively another expansion in how
broadly the property at issue is to be characterized, dicta in the Florida
Rock decision are sure to encourage other takings claims. In describing the nature of 404 regulation, the court lapsed into the wooden
dichotomy of distinguishing between regulation that secures a public
benefit from that which prevents a public harm.41 6 Worse, the court
classified preserving the wetland at issue as falling into the former cat412. See, e.g., Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1188-89 (Corps denied only two of five permits); Jentgen, 657
F.2d at 1212 (Corps offered modified permit); see also Barton II, supra note 97, at 388-89 (in fiscal year

1985 the Corps denied only 365 of 8464 applications for 404 permits, roughly 4.3%). In effect, when it
restricts and conditions permit approvals, the Corps is engaging in a form of "transferable development-rights" authorization, a concept the Supreme Court approved in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137.
413. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 895-96 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
414. See id. at 897.
415. Id. at 902-03 (rejecting exclusive reliance on an "immediate use" value); see Meyers, Murky
Waters: Florida Rock Revisited, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1986, at 17.
416. 791 F.2d at 904. For criticism of the public benefit vs. public harm dichotomy, see
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1196-97 (1967) (illustrating the difficulty of classifying regulations
as compensable or not according to whether they prevent harms or extract benefits); see also Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134 n.30 (1977) (suggesting that the "prevention of harm"
cases actually "are better understood as resting not on any supposed 'noxious' quality of the prohibited
uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a

policy . . . expected to produce widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated
property").
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egory, assuming that destruction of the wetland would produce no serious water pollution, thus doing "no harm." 4'17 Reliance on this
artificial dichotomy has led some state courts to conclude that wetland
development prohibitions were regulatory takings. 4 8 The Florida
Rock court seemed prepared to countenance a federal extension of this
misguided interpretation, 41 9 despite widespread recognition that wetland fills produce a variety of public harms, such as increased flood
risks, shoreline destabilization, diminished groundwater recharge, increased sedimentation of surface waters, and damage to commercial
and sport fisheries as a result of habitat destruction and food chain
alteration. 420 Nevertheless, in view of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements,4 2 ' FloridaRock's legacy probably will be increased challenges to 404 permit denials as unconstitutional takings. This is
especially likely in situations
where EPA has exercised its veto author2
ity under section

404(C).

42

B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court seems to have ensured a spate of cases alleging takings due to 404 permit denials. First, in Riverside Bayview it
instructed courts not to interpret 404 jurisdiction so as to avoid takings claims.4 23 Second, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. -County of Los Angeles,424 the Court finally approved awarding
money damages for temporary regulatory takings. This result will not
only encourage takings cases but will focus the litigation in the Claims
Court and the Federal Circuit, where indications are that some claimants may succeed. 425 Third, the Supreme Court has in fact found
417. 791 F.2d at 904.
418. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
419. See 791 F.2d at 904:
Denial of the permit requires [Florida Rock] to maintain at its own expense a facility, the
wetlands, which by presently received wisdom operates for the public good, and benefits a
large population who make no contribution to the expense of maintaining such facility.
This appears to be a situation where the balancing of public and private interests reveals a
private interest much more deserving of compensation for any loss actually incurred.
420. See, e.g., Barton 1I, supra note 97, at 373.
421.

See infra notes 423-429 and accompanying text.

422. See supra part IV.A. In 404(c) situations, the applicant will have already invested substantial time and expense in the administrative process. Moreover, the record for judicial review will be one

in which two government agencies ultimately disagreed in their views of the public interest.
423. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985); see supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
424. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). First English confirmed the strong signal sent in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), where a four-Justice dissent and a concurrence
opined that monetary damages should be awarded for regulatory takings.
425. See supra note 419 and accompanying text.
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some regulations to have worked takings.42 6 Most of these cases have
concerned situations where the regulation seemed to be seizing an
easement, 427 disrupting a bargain, 28 or eliminating a "fundamental attribute of property ownership." 42' 9
In defending 404 regulation in the anticipated welter of takings
cases, the government will want to emphasize the distinctions between
these cases and the 404 program. First, denials of 404 permits do not
represent seizures of property interests or attempts to secure public
benefits without payment. Instead, they are the product of a broadbased set of comprehensive environmental guidelines designed to prevent public harms associated with wetlands losses.43 ° In essence, permit denials restrain property uses that are tantamount to public
nuisances; such regulation, the Court recently affirmed, rarely requires
compensation.4 3' Second, 404 permit denials hardly involve broken
bargains; the geographic scope of the program is now well settled, and
the only constitutional guarantee landowners may assert against regulatory programs is denial of economic viability, taking into account all
the property at issue.43 2 Deltona and FloridaRock indicate that a very
broad view of the property will be taken, including upland uses and
permitted uses, in ascertaining economic viability.4 33 Moreover,
EPA's interpretation of the 404(b) guidelines, which requires applicants to focus first on means of accomplishing their project purposes
without filling wetlands,4 3 4 should help eliminate some potential takings claims and help answer others. Finally, unlike the right to ex426. On the takings cases from the Court's 1986 term, see Williams, Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Geneology of the Lochnerian Recurrence in
First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. COLo. L. REV. 427 (1988); Epstein, Takings: Descent
and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. C-. REV. I; Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause.: The
Search For A Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3 (1987). See generally The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1581 (1988).
427. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
428. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 167 (Corps earlier indicated that petitioners did not need permits
to develop lagoon).
429. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (right to transfer); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 164 (right
to exclude).
430. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 139-40 (1978), the
dissent indicated that broad-based comprehensive planning was less likely to run afoul of the takings
clause because it tends to secure an "average reciprocity of advantage."
431. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1987).
432. See supra notes 407, 410, 415 and accompanying text. See also United States v. 2,175.86
Acres of Land, 687 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (E.D. Tex. 1988) ("In considering the potential of the subject
tract for residential and other types of development, a reasonable, prudent, and knowledgeable buyer
would consider the necessity and likelihood of obtaining a '404' permit from the Corps of Engineers and
such consideration would directly influence the purchase price.").
433. See supra notes 407-409, 415 and accompanying text.
434. See supra part III.D.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972405

1989]

FEDERAL WETLANDS PROTECTION

clude and transfer,4 3 the right to develop has never been held to be a
fundamental attribute of property ownership. Given the high social
costs associated with ongoing wetlands losses,43 6 it ought to be too late
in the day to recognize a fundamental right to fill a wetland over government objection.4 37
C The Takings Executive Order
On March 15, 1988, in response to the takings cases of the
Supreme Court's 1987 term,43 8 President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,630 imposing on federal agencies a duty to protect property
rights in implementing regulatory programs. 439 The order requires
agencies to (1) prepare and submit to the Office of Management and
Budget takings implication assessments (TIA) for proposed governmental actions that may affect private property; (2) take no action to
regulate private property unless the restriction will "substantially advance" the same purpose as would an outright prohibition; and (3)
take no regulatory action that would be disproportionate to the "overall problem" the regulation addresses."' Justice Department guidelines interpreting the Executive Order make clear that the TIA
requires selection of the alternative that poses the "least risk" to private property."'
The Executive Order has been aptly criticized as an inaccurate
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions and as an exercise of
the Reagan Administration's political philosophy." 2 Since there were
apparently no regulatory takings awards against the government in
fiscal years 1985-87," 3 it seems unlikely that the order will produce
435. See supra note 429.
436. See supra text accompanying note 420; Barton 1, supra note 28, at 214 (annual wetland losses
of 300,000 to 458,000 acres).
437. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (takings necessarily involve a
weighing of public and private interests).
438. See supra notes 424, 426-427, 429, 431 and accompanying text.
439. 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988). The evolution of Executive Order 12,630 is traced in Marzulla,
The New "Takings" Executive Order and Environmental Regulation-Collision or Cooperation?, 18
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254 (1988).
440. Executive Order 12,630, §§ 4(d), (a), (b); see 53 Fed. Reg. at 8859.
441. Attorney General's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated
Takings, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,168 (1988).
442. See Jackson & Albaugh, A Critique of the Takings Executive Order in the Context of Environmental Regulation, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,463 (1988); McElfish, The Takings Executive
Order: Constitutional Jurisprudence or Political Philosophy?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,474

(1988).
443. Section 5(c) of the Executive Order required all federal agencies to submit to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) an itemized compilation of takings awards during 1985-87 and to
update them annually. The agencies reported no takings awards in their initial reports to OMB. See
McElfish, supra note 442, at 10,478.
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anything of consequence except paper work. Certainly a 404 permit
conditioned on mitigation "substantially advances" the same purpose
as a permit denial. Similarly, it is hard to imagine any 404 regulatory
action that would be "disproportionate" to the "overall problem" of
wetlands destruction, other than perhaps granting a permit for a wetland fill without ensuring that denial of the permit left no economically viable use of the land. 4 " However, the TIA requirement could
enable an ambivalent regulator to justify a permit for a wetland fill (or
an after-the-fact permit for an illegal fill) as posing the least risk to
private property. On the other hand, the Executive Order cannot prevent an administrator from carrying out statutory directives. Unfortunately, Congress has not spoken clearly enough to keep the Corps
from ratifying substantial wetland fills in the name of private property
rights.' 5 Executive Order 12,630 may serve to reinforce this lax regulatory attitude.
VII. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR REFORM

Section 404 regulation is characterized by a healthy, pluralistic
review process but also a good deal of regulatory ambivalence and a
considerable amount of intergovernmental tension. Pluralistic review
is a consequence of the program's expansive scope, both in terms of
geographic jurisdiction and in the great variety of activities it regulates. With such a broad canvass, making permit decisions only after
an opportunity for affected individuals and agencies to become involved is essential to the program's legitimacy." 6 Moreover, pluralistic review improves prospects for identifying practicable, less
damaging alternatives, the heart of the permit criteria." 7 While the
Corps of Engineers has made some attempts to reduce the influence of
commenting agencies in permit decisions," 8 the courts have been sensitive to adverse comments by agencies with environmental expertise." 9' This is a healthy development for a program heavily
dependent on value judgments about the availability of alternatives,
the efficacy of mitigation measures, and the existence or significance of
adverse effects on the aquatic environment. The emphasis on 404's
444. See supra text accompanying notes 432-433.
445. For example, consider the Corp's response to the Russo fill, supra note 349 and accompanying text.
446. See, e.g., supra notes 254-257, 266-270 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 277-284 and accompanying text.
448. See supra note 257 (elimination of "great weight" accorded to the views of federal and state
fish and wildlife agencies); supra notes 93, 260-265 and accompanying text (limitations on administrative appeals); note 290 and accompanying text (Corps' ability to interpret 404(b) guidelines independent
of EPA).
449. See supra notes 267-270 and accompanying text.
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pluralistic review process has helped the program overcome some of
the problems associated with the regulatory ambivalence that also has
been a hallmark of the program.
Nevertheless, 404 regulation has experienced an extremely rocky
first seventeen years. The result is a half-hearted program protecting
the nation's wetlands, one that countenances continued losses of more
than 300,000 acres of wetlands annually. Much of the cause of the
program's ineffectiveness is due to the Corps. Never viewing section
404 as a wetlands protection program, a5 ° the Corps has failed to implement the program consistently or aggressively. But EPA is not
blameless; its substitution of sporadic vetoes for a comprehensive program oversight role has contributed materially to the program's ineffectiveness. And congressional inattention has allowed the 404
program to waffle along, hampered by regulatory ambivalence and intergovernmental disagreement.
Both administrative and legislative reforms are necessary if the
404 program is to finally become, after nearly two decades, an effective
vehicle for protecting the nation's wetlands. We examine needed administrative changes before turning to legislative suggestions.
A. Administrative Reforms
1. The General Accounting Office and National Wetlands
Policy Forum Reports
Two major reports evaluated the section 404 program in 1988.
First, in July, the General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report
investigating implementation of the permit program by five Corps district offices. 45 ' The report concluded that section 404 fails to provide
comprehensive wetlands protection because (1)it does not reach many
activities that destroy wetlands, especially agricultural drainage
activities;45 2 (2) the Corps does not use the full range of the regulatory
authority it has;45 3 (3) the Corps frequently ignores the recommenda450. See, e.g., Testimony of Robert K. Dawson, Acting Ass't Secretary of the Army for Civil

Works, Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Sen. Comm. on Environment and
Public Works II (May 21, 1985) (stating Corps view that "Congress did not design § 404 to be a

wetlands protection mechanism and it does not function well in that capacity"), reported in Senate
Subcommittee Holds Clean Water Act § 404 Oversight Hearings, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug.

1985, at 8, 9.
451. GAO REPORT, supra note 12. The report was prepared at the request of Rep. James Oberstar, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Public Works Committee. The five
Corps Districts it evaluated were Baltimore, Maryland; Jacksonville, Florida; Omaha, Nebraska; Portland, Oregon; and Vicksburg, Michigan. Id. at I.
452. Id. at 3, 19-20 (noting that the majority of wetland losses are the result of agricultural land
conversions, including an estimated 80% between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s).
453. Id. at 3, 23-32 (citing the Corps' disagreements with EPA and fish and wildlife agencies over
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tions of fish and wildlife agencies;4 54 and (4) the program lacks any
systematic monitoring and enforcement. 455 These findings led the
GAO to recommend that the Corps begin to develop baseline information to determine the 404 program's effect on wetlands, establish new
procedures to resolve disagreements with resource agencies over the
program's jurisdiction and to facilitate administrative appeals, and implement a coordinated enforcement program.4 56
Four months after release of the GAO report, the National Wetlands Policy Forum-a twenty-member panel consisting of governors,
other state and local officials, and representatives of environmental
groups and the farming, forestry, and ranching communities-recommended adoption of a goal of "no net loss" of the nation's wetlands.4 57
To achieve this goal, the Forum emphasized a number of nonregulatory mechanisms such as increased government incentives to private
wetland owners to preserve wetlands, more funding for government
purchase of wetlands, and greater scrutiny of government programs
that may encourage wetland destruction. 458 Regulatory changes advocated by the Forum report included increased delegation of program
responsibilities to the states, 459 adoption of a single wetlands definition
for regulatory purposes, 46 0 and expansion of the program to include
the delineation of wetlands boundaries, the definition of practicable alternatives to proposed activities
with less damaging environmental effects, and the consideration of cumulative impacts).
454. Id. at 4, 37-52 (Corps rejected resource agency views in 37% of sample cases; nevertheless,
few administrative appeals were undertaken because of limited staff and reluctance of the Corps to
reverse District Engineers).
455. Id. at 4-5, 55-74 (no field inspections and surveillance to identify and prosecute unauthorized
fills; no monitoring and enforcement of general permits; lax enforcement of permit violations).
456. Id. at 4-5, 33-34, 53, 74. See also supra notes 350-357 and accompanying text.

457. FORUM REPORT, supra note 12, at 3, 18-19 (interim goal of achieving no overall net loss of
the nation's remaining wetlands; long-term goal of increasing quantity and quality of the nation's
wetlands).
458. Id. at 3-4, 27-33, 49-55. The Forum Report also suggested that greater resources be devoted
to mapping wetlands and obtaining better information about how wetland systems operate, what functions they perform, and what activities threaten them. Id. at 57-59. To finance its recommendations,
the Forum recommended a number of revenue sources, see id. at 65-67, including dedicating a portion
of fines and settlements from enforcement activities to wetlands acquisition, restoration, and creation,
id. at 41.
459. Id. at 5-6, 21-23 (including recommendations that states be allowed to assume permit responsibility for (I) all waters in their jurisdiction, not just for waters other than traditionally navigable
waters; and (2) "discrete and clearly identifiable" portions of the regulatory program, rather than the
entire program (e.g., wetland fills but not constructive activities in open waters or dam construction).
In addition, the report recommended that states with permit responsibilities be given assurance that
federal activities would be consistent with the state program, similar to the promise made to states
under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451-1464 (1982). Id. at 23. It also suggested
that, while EPA should exercise "appropriate oversight" of approved state 404 programs, this oversight
normally should be restricted to annual program review, not individual permit reviews, except as necessary to exercise EPA's veto authority. Id. at 22.
460. Id. at 38.
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activities such as excavation and drainage. 4 6 ' The report also recommended revised mitigation policies, including establishing mitigation
banks and favoring avoidance and minimization of adverse effects
rather than creation of substitute wetlands.46 2
Both the GAO and the Forum reports contain a number of
needed reforms in the 404 program at a time when a new administration, headed by a self-proclaimed environmentalist, 463 has taken office.
However, the GAO report failed to attempt to explain why the Corps
and EPA often possess divergent perspectives concerning the delineation of wetland boundaries and why the Corps frequently ignores the
advice of fish and wildlife agencies. We believe that the answers lie in
an understanding of the Corps' deep-seated ambivalence to its role as
wetlands protector, and that, had the GAO investigated the underlying reasons, it would have recognized as naive its suggestion that new
Corps "procedures" would ameliorate the problems."
The Forum report suffers from greater deficiencies. For example,
it combines advocacy of greater wetlands protection with a simultaneous goal of reducing costs, delays, and frustrations for the regulated
sectors.46 s We contend that while both goals are commendable, this
vision of painless wetlands protection is unrealistic; the history of 404
regulation indicates that the "expedited permit processing" goal often
undermines the wetlands protection goal, especially in the case of general permits.4 6 6 Moreover, the Forum's "no net loss" goal, while laudable, seems to be the product of an uninformed reliance on wetland
creation and restoration. Wetland creation and restoration remain unproven technologies-some fifty percent of such projects fail 46 7-and
at best can replace only certain wetland functions (e.g., flood storage)
but not others (e.g., groundwater recharge and wildlife habitat).4 6 8
Further, if "no net loss" is not restricted to an individual project level,
it assumes that wetlands are fungible when in fact they differ in type,
value, and regional importance. Further, the Forum report endorses
both regional general permits and the exemptions for "minor" activi461. Id. at 4, 44-46 (noting, however, that any expansion of section 404 jurisdiction would not
modify existing exemptions from permit requirements for normal farming, ranching, and silvicultural
activities. See supra text accompanying notes 159-161.
462. FORUM REPORT, supra note 12, at 42-44.
463. See Bush, George Bush on the Environment, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,293 (1988).
464. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 34.
465. See FORUM REPORT, supra note 12, at 38-41.
466. See, e.g., supra notes 94-96, 196-201 and accompanying text.
467. See FORUM REPORT, supra note 12, at 61. See also supra note 320.
468. Telephone interview with Douglas Thompson, supra note 325.
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ties contained in section 404(f),46 9 both of which have proved to be
major vehicles for wetlands destruction.4 7 °
The shortcomings of these reports should not obscure their contributions. The GAO report pointed to two Achilles heels of the 404
program: insufficient deference by the Corps to the opinions of EPA
and fish and wildlife agencies and a general lack of enforcement. 47
The Forum's "no net loss" goal is a laudable one if in fact it does not
encourage a rash of wetland fills whose justification depends on the
creation or restoration of other wetlands. The reality is that, if the
nation is to approach such a goal realistically, many projects must be
denied regardless of the amount of proposed wetlands creation or restoration. The "no net loss" goal must be achieved first by preventing
all major or avoidable wetland losses and seeking compensation only
for remaining minor, unavoidable wetland losses.4 72
Whether the GAO and Forum reports signal the dawn of an era
of more vigorous wetlands protection is hardly clear at this writing.
They do, however, suggest a governmental attitude more receptive to
wetlands regulation than in the past. The transformation of that
promise into reality will require a number of administrative changes
beyond those suggested by the GAO and Forum reports, as detailed
below.
2. Asserting Jurisdiction Over Nonadjacent Wetlands
Although Riverside Bayview gave strong support to federal jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to other waterbodies and to the Corps'
ecologically based definition of wetlands, the Supreme Court expressly
reserved judgment on the issue of jurisdiction over nonadjacent wetlands. 473 This has encouraged the Corps to make jurisdictional decisions concerning these areas on a case-by-case basis, considering each
wetland's connection to interstate commerce. The result is the inconsistent assertions of regulatory jurisdiction by thirty-six different
Corps districts and the effective sanctioning of a number of fills of
nonadjacent wetlands through failure to assert jurisdiction. In the cu469. FORUM REPORT, supra note 12, at 41-45.
470. See, e.g., supra notes 164, 176, 192-201 and accompanying text.
471. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 701 F. Supp. 868, 913 (D. Me. 1988) (declining to disturb the
Corps' refusal to deny a permit despite the objections of EPA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration).
472. Telephone interview with Douglas Thompson, supra note 325.
473. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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rious Pond 12 decision, the Corps' position seemed to receive approval
from a district court in Texas.4 74
In contrast to the Corps, EPA views 404 jurisdiction as extending
to all wetlands that could potentially supply habitat for migratory
birds.4"' In practice, this would assert federal jurisdiction over all
wetlands regardless of their proximity to another waterbody.
If the Pond 12 result gains widespread judicial acceptance, the
Corps will have achieved its longstanding goal of eliminating its responsibility to assert jurisdiction over all nonadjacent wetlands. This
has been a Corps objective since 1972, pursued originally by a narrow
construction of its jurisdiction, then by issuance of a nationwide permit, and now through selective determinations of no interstate commerce effects and a strategy of nonenforcement.4" 6 Pond 12 illustrates
the failure of section 404 to supply comprehensive wetlands protection. The Corps has long claimed that the 404 program is not a wetlands protection
mechanism. 477
Through its case-by-case
constitutional test for nonadjacent wetlands, the Corps seems committed to ensuring the truth of that contention.
To rectify this situation, EPA must use its 404 oversight and veto
powers to force the Corps to expand its jurisdiction over nonadjacent
wetlands. 47 Though EPA believes 404 jurisdiction should extend to
the full reach of the Constitution, 479 it has been unwilling to assert this
position consistently when the Corps has declined jurisdiction. In
view of the flood and erosion control, water quality, and fishery
habitat values that wetlands ensure, EPA must exercise more consistent oversight over the Corps' jurisdictional decisions.48 °
3. Confining the General Permit Program
Section 404(e) authorizes the Corps to issue general permits ex474. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher (Pond 12), 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987); see
supra text accompanying notes 143-150 for discussion of the case.
475. See supra notes 127, 139 and accompanying text.
476. See Jackson, supra note 140, at 8-9 (recounting the history of Corps resistance, noting that
the latest strategy was devised as a response to the National Wildlife Federationsettlement, supra note
100, in which the Corps committed to individual permits for nonadjacent wetlands larger than 10 acres,
and describing as a Corps "top priority" the issuance of a new nationwide permit to eliminate the 10acre cutoff).

477. See, e.g., Testimony of Robert K. Dawson, supra note 450, at 9.
478. See supra part IV.
479. EPA's position, supra note 139 and accompanying text, is entirely consistent with the Clean
Water Act's legislative history, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
480. The new Corps-EPA Jurisdiction MOA, discussed supra notes 151-155, may supply EPA
with the means to oversee jurisdictional determinations more effectively, but it still leaves most of those
decisions to the Corps. Further, the MOA only establishes procedures for EPA oversight; it does not
promise any specific EPA actions.
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empting certain categories of activities from the individual permit requirement.48 ' The statute restricts general permits to activities that
are "similar in nature," that have only minimal individual or cumulative adverse effects, and that satisfy the 404(b) guidelines. 4 82 However,
the Corps has interpreted 404 also to allow general permits for certain
classes of water, despite no apparent statutory authority.4 8 a In addition, there is the question of whether the entire general permit program meets the requirement that permitted activities produce only
"minimal cumulative adverse effect."14 84 Although their precise im-

pacts are unknown, general permits are a substantial contributing
fac45
tor in the alarming annual rate of national wetland loss.

Congress limited the duration of general permits to five years,
with provision for renewal.4 86 Implied in this five-year limit is the notion that the Corps would periodically review the program to ensure
that the permits actually satisfied the congressional mandates of complying with the 404(b)(1) guidelines and producing "minimal cumulative adverse effect." ' 487 However, when the permits expired in 1987,
the Corps simply reissued them, with no discussion of why experience
with the permits showed they satisfied the statutory standards.4 88 If
the Corps' assertions of regulatory jurisdiction must be based
on thor490
ough study, 489 its regulatory abdications warrant no less.

Because only some permittees are required to notify the Corps of
their proposed discharge activities,4 9' the Corps is poorly equipped to
gather information on numerous activities authorized by nationwide
permits, let alone those authorized by regional and "programmatic"
481.

See supra part II.C.

482. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1344(e)(1)

(1982).

483. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
484. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1).
485. See Barton I1,supra note 97, at 374; see also supra notes 96, 197 and accompanying text.
486. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2).
487. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(e)(1) (compliance with 404(b) guidelines, minimum cumulative effect),
1344(e)(2) (5-year limit).
488. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986) (Corps' statement it was "reissuing the 26 nationwide permits..
as modified and conditioned").
489. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539 (E.D.N.C. 1985); see also supra
note 135 and accompanying text.
490. See 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.12, at 191 (nationwide permits are exemptions by rule
in everything but name, transferring individualized permitting into an administrative rule based on a
one-time-only guess that effects will be minimal).
491. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 330.5(a)(7) (1988) (outfall structures), -.5(a)(17) (small hydropower
projects), -.5(a)(21) (surface coal mining activities), -.5(a)(26) (activities above the "headwaters" and in
"isolated" waters between I and 10 acres). See also id.§ 330.7 (notification procedures for activities
located above the "headwaters" and in "isolated" waters, requiring 20 days advanced written notice to
the Corps prior to discharge).
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permits4 92 and "letters of permission.

' 493

More extensive reporting re-

quirements seem absolutely necessary to supply the data to determine
whether particular general permits meet the 404(e) criteria. The
Corps should reissue no general permit after its expiration without a
specific finding, with supporting factual data, that it satisfies the statutory limitations, including producing only "minimal cumulative
effects."
4. Limiting After-the-Fact Permits
The Corps may issue after-the-fact permits to cure discharges
made illegally without a permit. 494 Perhaps after-the-fact permits are
simply a reflection of hard realities of administering a nationwide permit program regulating numerous diverse activities. However, the
Corps has failed to supply specific criteria governing their issuance,4 95
and its District Engineers issue them too freely. In effect, the Corps
has encouraged dischargers to pursue a form of "self help for the impatient" 49 6 that undermines the integrity of the permit program. Both
the 404(b) guidelines and the Corps' regulations should be clarified to
ensure that the Corps does not view after-the-fact permits as the preferred alternative to undertaking enforcement against unauthorized
discharges.
5. Redefining Practicable Alternatives
Widespread wetlands losses continue despite the fact that the
404(b) guidelines require permit denial for activities producing "signif'
icant degradation to the aquatic ecosystem." 497
Although the 404(b)
guidelines establish a presumption against discharges where there are

492. Only nationwide permits are issued through notice and comment rulemaking and published
in the Corps regulations. 33 C.F.R. §§ 325.2(a)(2), 330.4(a). Regional permits are issued by Division
or District Engineers, after public notice. Id. §§ 325.2(e)(2), -.3(b), -.5(c)(1). "Programmatic" permits
are a type of general permit "founded on an existing state, local or other Federal agency program and
designed to avoid duplication with that program." Id. § 325.5(c)(3). While the Corps' regulations
restrict activities authorized by general permits to those causing minimal individual and cumulative
environmental impacts, they seem to have eliminated the requirement that activities be "similar" in
nature (or "substantially similar," see supra note 199) when the general permit is one designed to avoid
"unnecessary duplication of ...regulatory control." See 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(f).
493. Letters of permission are "a type of permit issued through an abbreviated processing procedure which includes coordination with Federal and state fish and wildlife agencies, as required by the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, and a public interest evaluation, but without the publishing of an
individual public notice." 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(e)(1). See also id. § 325.5(b)(2).
494. See supra part 1II.A.2.
495. Some years ago, one of us recommended that the Corps regulations take into account the
size of the fill, the value of the wetlands, and the good faith of the applicant. See Blumm, supra note 10,
at486-87 n.97.
496. 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.13, at 217.
497. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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practicable alternatives having a less damaging impact on the aquatic
ecosystem, this presumption has been easily circumvented by the narrow definition of projects and their alternatives proferred by permit
applicants. The Corps has proved too deferential to developers' definitions of alternatives and has failed to consider their ultimate objectives. For example, in one case the Corps determined that there were
no feasible alternatives to a 127-acre fill for commercial development
because other sites would offer a less attractive marketing package to
purchasers. 498 In another situation, the Corps limited its consideration to alternatives that would fulfill the applicant's avowed purpose of
increasing soybean production and failed to499
examine alternative economic uses not envisioned by the applicant.
Part of the problem has been caused by the Corps' view that the
404(b) guidelines require it to take the applicant's objectives as a
given.500 However, as the Sweeden's Swamp case makes clear, neither
the Corps nor EPA need take an applicant's analysis of alternatives at
face value.5° i Further, if the 404 program is to contain wetlands loss
effectively, the 404(b) guidelines must be interpreted to forbid significant wetland losses irrespective of whether there are practicable alternatives to particular projects.50 2 The only relevant alternative is
whether the applicant retains an economically viable use of its property as a whole. 503 Because the Corps maintains that it may interpret
the guidelines independently from EPA,-0 4 such a change undoubtedly
will require an amendment to the guidelines.5 "5
6. Energizing EPA's 404(c) Veto Power
The Sweeden's Swamp case confirmed EPA's 404(c) veto power
as a potent tool for wetlands protection.5 0 6 The Second Circuit sustained EPA's ability to conduct independent evaluations of Corps in498. National Audubon Soc'y v. Hartz Mountain Devel. Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,724 (D.N.J. 1983); see supra note 302 and accompanying text.
499. Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra note 303 and
accompanying text.
500. See id.
501. See supra notes 317-326 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 283, 305 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 407-410, 415 and accompanying text.
504. See supra text accompanying note 290.
505. The guidelines should expressly prohibit wetland fills for nonwater-dependent uses unless the
applicant demonstrates no economically viable uses. Alternatively, the guidelines could reinstate a
version of the requirement contained in the 1975 guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.5(b)(8) (1975), that sanctioned wetland fills "only when it can be demonstrated that the site is the least environmentally damaging alternative." See Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41, 52 n. 100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 68 (1987).

506. See supra part IV.B.
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terpretations of 404(b) guidelines and to determine what are
unacceptable losses of wetlands.5" 7 Further, the court ratified both
EPA's "market entry" test for judging the availability of alternative
sites and its "hard look" at alternatives proffered by applicants.5 °8
Whether EPA will invoke 404(c) on a regular basis, and whether the
Corps will recognize the precedents established in 404(c) proceedings
in its interpretations of the 404(b) guidelines remain key unanswered
questions. 509

Prospective use of 404(c) could protect critical aquatic areas prior
to the development of site-specific controversies and could increase the
predictability of 404 regulation. 10 Use of 404(c) in this manner could
be encouraged by areawide mapping conducted under the National
Wetlands Inventory"1 ' or state coastal zone management programs.512
Moreover, the 404(c) regulations ought to enable federal and state

agencies and members of the public to submit petitions for prospective
prohibitions and establish a process for evaluating the merits of the
petitions. Unfortunately, to date EPA has yet to devote the resources
necessary to make 404(c) an effective vehicle to designate high value
wetlands and special aquatic sites unsuitable for discharges, although
recent EPA "advanced identification" efforts in Maine, Nebraska,
513
New Jersey, and New York offer hope for the future.
EPA's veto power can be used to protect some wetlands, but an
effective regulatory program cannot ultimately depend on vetoes or
threats of vetoes. Use of 404(c) in a prospective manner could avoid
some vetoes, especially if a public petitioning process were established,
but these designations are likely to be controversial, time-consuming,
and limited to relatively few sites. Fundamental changes at the program operation level-in the decision process used to determine
whether to issue a permit-as well as additional congressional support
are necessary if section 404 is to become a regulatory program effectively protecting wetlands.
507. Bersani v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd,

850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1556 (1989). See supra notes 317-324 and accompanying text.
508. See supra notes 325-326 and accompanying text.

509. EPA is in the process of revising its 404(c) regulations (currently codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 131) to make 404(c) vetoes procedurally less cumbersome.
510. See Cooper, Wetlands or Wastelands?, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July-Aug. 1985, at 4-5;
Nagle, supra note 98, at 249-50.
511. See supra note 123; Blumm, supra note 10, at 479-80 (advocating use of wetland maps for
regulatory purposes).
512. On the relationship between state coastal planning and 404 regulation, see Blumm, Wetlands
Protection and Coastal Planning: Avoiding the Perils of Positive Consistency, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 69
(1978) (state coastal zone plans cannot eliminate application of 404(b) guidelines).
513. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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B. Legislative Reforms
Administrative reforms can improve section 404's effectiveness as
a wetlands protection program. However, because of the program's
history of intergovernmental tension and regulatory ambivalence, administrative reforms alone will not likely furnish a complete solution."1 4 The GAO Report recommended that Congress (1) enact
clearer criteria concerning the delineation of wetlands subject to the
program, (2) specify the extent to which alternatives to wetland fills
must be considered, and (3) clarify how cumulative impacts should
affect permit decisions.5 5 The program also badly needs congressionally established goals against which to measure the adequacy of administrative implementation. The National Wetlands Policy Forum's
proposed "no net loss" goal deserves careful consideration, especially
if it is interpreted to include qualitative as well as quantitative losses
and is applied on a project-by-project basis rather than a regional or
national basis.5 t 6
Establishment of such a goal should also prompt reconsideration
of the congressional exemption of "normal" farming activities,' 1 7 congressional authorization of the general permit program, 5' 8 and permit
criteria that aim to prevent only "significant" wetland losses.5" 9 Each
of these measures may inevitably tolerate cumulative wetland losses of
hundreds of thousands of acres per year. Moreover, "no net loss" cannot be measured in terms of proposed wetlands created or restored.
520
Given the sorry track record of dischargers' mitigation plans,
projects whose approval depends on substitute wetlands must be
bonded in a manner similar to surface mining operations under the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. 521 Whether or not
514. See Goldman-Carter, New Legislation, Not "Business as Usual", ENVTL. FORUM, Jan.-Feb.

1989, at 20, 22:
New national wetlands legislation must be more than just a fine tuning of the existing § 404
program. Trying to graft a national no net loss policy onto § 404 would be as futile as
trying to cram my toddler into last year's snowsuit: arms and legs half exposed, the zipper
will not zip, he cannot walk, and he can barely breathe. The wetlands protection task
ahead is simply too big for the existing § 404 program to accommodate.

See also Oberstar, Section 404: Should Congress Reenter the Fray?, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.Dec. 1988, at 5-6.
515. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5, 33. See also Tripp & Herz, supra note 7, at 235 (advocating a uniform wetland delineation methodology based on the National Wetlands Inventory's revised
lists of hydrophytic plants and hydric soils).
516. See supra notes 467-469 and accompanying text.
517. See supra text accompanying note 164 (80% of wetlands lost due to agricultural activities).
518. See supra notes 96, 197 and accompanying text.
519. See supra notes 283, 320 and accompanying text.
520. See supra notes 305, 320, 467 and accompanying text.
521. 30 U.S.C. § 1259 (1982) (performance bonds are required, which must be sufficient to assure
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Congress adopts the Forum's "no net loss" goal, it ought to fortify the
404 program by enacting the following four measures: (1) establish a
national goal to preserve, protect, and where possible, enhance the nation's wetland acreage; (2) require EPA to report annually on the cumulative losses of wetlands on nationwide, regional, and statewide
bases; (3) specifically proscribe any discharge or general permit pro(4)
ducing a significant quantitative or qualitative loss of wetlands; and
5 22
define discharge to include draining as well as filling wetlands.
Ultimately, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that most of the 404
523
program's problems have to do with the permit issuing agency.
While not exactly "the fox in the chicken coop,"5 24 the Corps has long
been ambivalent about wetlands protection. As recently as 1985, the
head of the Corps informed Congress that 404 was not designed to be
a wetlands protection program,5 25 despite legislative history 526 and
Supreme Court authority5 27 to the contrary. While "shared custody"
of the program has its merits, 528 after seventeen years it seems clear
that Congress could have chosen better custodians. It is time for Congress to reduce intergovernmental tensions and eliminate regulatory
ambivalence by removing the Corps' permit authority, as the Senate
wanted to do in 1976.529 This could be accomplished by (1) elevating
the role of federal and state fish and wildlife agencies in the permit
process, especially in the determination of whether an area is a water
of the United States, 30° (2) transferring Corps personnel to EPA and
federal fish and wildlife agencies, and (3) increasing grant money to
induce states to assume permit responsibilities.5 1 These changes need
completion of the reclamation plan if the work has to be performed by a regulatory agency in the event
of applicant forfeiture).
522. See FORUM REPORT, supra note 12, at 44-46 (discussing harmful effects of wetland
draining).
523. See Jackson, Agencies in a Muddle, supra note 140, at 9 (arguing that Congress should relieve the Corps of its permit responsibilities).
524. See Power, supra note 15.
525.
526.
527.
528.

See supra note 477 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74, 361 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
See Nagle, supra note 98.

529. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
530. Under the National Wetlands Inventory, 33 U.S.C. § 1288(i)(2) (1982), Congress has subsidized wetland mapping for over a decade. See Barton II, supra note 97, at 381. If these maps were used
to make jurisdictional determinations, they could substantially reduce administrative costs.
531. See supra part I.D. There seems to be no compelling reason not to authorize state permit
program jurisdiction over all waters, thus entirely displacing Corps 404 permits. In this event, Congress might want to confine Corps § l0 permits, see supra note 24 and accompanying text, to navigation
concerns, assuming that state 404 programs provide opportunities for public and interagency review
and comment, apply the 404(b) guidelines, and are subject to EPA veto. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)-(h)
(1982).
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not necessarily increase the cost of administering the program; by reducing intergovernmental tension, they should reduce the transaction
costs of considering most proposed discharges.
In the final analysis, it is not the cost of administering the 404
program that should concern Congress, but the social costs associated
with wetland losses on the order of a million acres every three years.
Those costs make the current 404 program too expensive to maintain.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972405

